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I. INTRODUCTION
A judge ought to prepare his way to a just sentence, as God
useth to prepare his way, by raising valleys and taking
down hills: so when there appeareth on either side an high
hand, violent prosecution, cunning advantages taken,
combination, power, great counsel, then is the virtue of a
judge seen, to make inequality equal; that he may plant his
judgment as upon an even ground.'
It is axiomatic that the confidence of a civilized people in its
government depends on the fairness and consistency in the formation and
application of its laws. The difficulty in forming ideal criminal sentencing
1. FRANCIS BACON, ESSAYS 549-50 (Richard Whately ed., Lee and Shepard 1875) (1625).
laws lies in the fact that "fairness" and "consistency" are often competing
factors. In the United States federal court system, sentencing guidelines and
congressionally mandated minimum sentencing statutes have been enacted
in an attempt to strike a balance between these two goals.2
These sentencing statutes and guidelines are the tools used by district
court judges who must carry out the unimaginable task of staring a fellow
human being in the eye while gauging how much of his life to strip away.
Should these judges be forced to adhere to such statutes and guidelines to
ensure that those who commit similar crimes receive similar sentences? Or
should judges be given the flexibility to tailor each sentence to the unique
circumstances of the individual being sentenced?
The debate over the extent of judicial discretion in sentencing has raged
on in the United States for as long as crimes have been committed. From
"three strike" laws3 to "mandatory" sentencing guidelines, one need not
travel far to find an opinion on the subject. History is replete with stories of
judges granting unthinkably extreme sentences to criminal defendants.4
Such stories include criticisms of "activist judges" and complaints over
severe disparities from one sentence to the next.5 It is without question that
2. See infra notes 18-22 (discussing the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and mandatory
sentencing statutes).
3. See People v. Romero, 122 Cal. Rptr. 2d 399 (Ct. App. 2002) (affirming a sentence of
twenty-five years to life pursuant to California's Three Strikes law for a defendant convicted of
stealing a $3 magazine).
4. Of recent notoriety is the case of Genarlow Wilson, a seventeen-year-old high school senior
who was arrested after receiving consensual oral sex from a fifteen-year-old at a New Year's Eve
party. See Brenda Goodman, Georgia Court Frees Man Convicted in Sex Case, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
27, 2007, at A9, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/27/us/27georgia.html. He was a star
athlete (who lost his scholarship) and honors student with no criminal record. Id. Wilson rejected a
five year plea offer and was sentenced to ten years in prison. Id. The sentence was considered by
many to be draconian and sparked a public outcry. Id. After serving more than two years of his
sentence behind bars, he was released by a divided 4-3 Georgia Supreme Court. Id. The majority
characterized his sentence as "grossly disproportionate to his crime" and further wrote that "the
severe felony punishment and sex offender registration imposed on Wilson make no measurable
contribution to acceptable goals of punishment." Humphrey v. Wilson, 652 S.E.2d 501, 507, 509
(2007).
5. Judicial activism is often discussed when someone does not agree with the outcome of
legislation. Shortly after her retirement from the bench, Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor commented on it in an interview:
For the immediate future, I've been very concerned about the number of verbal attacks on
judges-and a few physical attacks as well from time to time. I have felt that the public
concern has followed the concerns expressed by various legislators both in Congress and
state legislatures, concerns about so-called activist judges. I suspect when people hear
legislators so often publicly denounce activist, godless judges that people start thinking
that's the situation. It's very much a concern to me.Q & A with Sandra Day O'Connor, TIME, Sep. 28, 2006, http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/
0,8599,1540702,00.html; see also Wikipedia, Judicial Activism, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Judicialactivism (quoting several U.S. Supreme Court Justices on their definitions of the term
"judicial activism") (last visited Apr. 2, 2009).
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refining the sentencing process has proven to be a difficult and complex
task.6
Furthering this endeavor, the United States Supreme Court recently
released two eagerly anticipated decisions markedly impacting federal
sentencing, Gall v. United States7 and Kimbrough v. United States.8 Prior to
the simultaneous release of these decisions on December 10, 2007, activist
groups and the media alike were buzzing with speculation, particularly over
Kimbrough-the notorious crack/powder cocaine disparity case. 9  It had
become a common perception that crack related offenses were being
punished "100 times harsher" than corresponding powder cocaine related
offenses and that minorities were feeling the brunt of the disparate
treatment. 10
6. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 412 (1993)
("[The federal sentencing] guidelines.., were not the last word. There have been amendments, and
amendments of amendments; the whole process has become hideously complex. As of April of
1992, there were 434 of these amendments, and the guidelines were well on their way to a level of
convolution and intricacy hardly matched by any other laws-maybe the Internal Revenue Code.").
7. 128 S. Ct. 586 (2007).
8. 128 S. Ct. 558 (2007).
9. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Court to Weigh Disparities in Cocaine Laws, N.Y. TIMES, June
12, 2007, at A I5, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/12/washington/12scotus.html?
pagewanted=all; J.C. Watts & Pat Nolan, Editorial, Powder and Crack Cocaine, WASH. TIMES, Oct.
31, 2007, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2007/oct/3/powder-and-crack-cocaine; Charles
Lane, Supreme Court to Review Judges' Discretion in Cocaine Sentences, WASH. POST, June 12,
2007, at AS, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/06/l1 /
AR2007061101620.html. "Crack" is the street name and most commonly used term for cocaine
base. Although the term "cocaine base" is a more appropriate and neutral term for an academic
study, the author has elected to adopt the Court's language for the sake of uniformity. See
Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. 558 (using the designation "crack/powder disparity" throughout its opinion
when referencing the sentencing disparity between offenses involving cocaine base and identical
offenses involving cocaine hydrochloride); see also infra note 214 (explaining the difference
between powder cocaine and crack cocaine); infra notes 24-26 (discussing the 100-to-I sentencing
ratio between crack and powder cocaine).
10. Darryl Fears, Bush Seeks More Violent Crime Funds, WASH. POST, Jan. 25, 2008, at A3,
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/0l/
24/AR2 0 0 80124033
81.html ("Under mandatory minimum sentencing guidelines approved by Congress 20 years ago,
crack cocaine offenders, most of whom are black, received prison terms that were 100 times harsher
than powder cocaine offenders, who typically are white and Latino."). To say that the sentence is
100 times harsher is a misnomer. Technically, it would be more correct to say that it takes 100 times
the quantity of powder cocaine as that of crack to qualify for the same sentence. Hundreds of news
and academic articles have been written documenting the disproportionately harsh sentences among
black defendants resulting from the 100-to-I ratio. See, e.g., Op-Ed., Rationality in Crack
Sentencing, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 1997, at A20, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/full
page.html?res=9AOCE6DD103BF930A15754COA961958260 ("President Clinton took a step
toward fairer drug sentencing yesterday when he proposed narrowing the disparity that treats crimes
involving crack cocaine, popular in poor black neighborhoods, 100 times as harshly as crimes
involving powdered cocaine, popular among whites. The change had been recommended by
759
Serious questions have arisen questioning the integrity of federal
sentencing: Can district courts depart from the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines (the Guidelines) based on their own views of "reasonableness,"
or are they bound to strict adherence to the Guidelines? If courts are free to
depart from sentencing ranges set forth in the Guidelines, can they do so
based on a general belief that the crack/powder cocaine disparity is
inherently unfair, or must they do so only on an "as applied" basis? Should
changes in this area of the law be applied retroactively, or only
prospectively? Gall and Kimbrough ultimately provide the answers to all of
these questions, but in the process create several new ones. "
This Comment examines the Court's decisions in Gall and Kimbrough
and discusses their ramifications. Part II examines the history of the
Guidelines and discusses the jurisprudential evolution leading up to Gall and
Kimbrough.12  Part III sets forth a detailed analysis and critique of both
opinions. 13 Part IV explores both the practical and legal impact of these
cases. 14 Finally, Part V concludes with a summary and parting comments.' 5
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
In order to understand the current state of sentencing in the federal court
system, it is crucial to have a clear understanding of its historical
development. As an academic exercise, it would be thought-provoking to
travel back to constitutional times and trace the evolution of sentencing in
American courts; however, for the limited scope of this article, it suffices to
start from 1984.16
Attorney General Janet Reno and the White House drug policy director.... Ms. Reno and Mr.
McCaffrey ... recognized the danger of turning a blind eye to a disparity that 'has become an
important symbol of racial injustice in our criminal justice system."' (emphasis added)); see also
infra note 31 (listing other academic articles discussing the crack/powder disparity).
11. See infra Part IV.B (discussing unanswered questions and practical implications of Gall and
Kimbrough).
12. See infra notes 16-77 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 79-277 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 281-366 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 367-373 and accompanying text.
16. In his dissenting opinion in Gall, Justice Alito cites several cases from the 18th century in his
discussion of the Sixth Amendment, drawing historical analogs to our modem day sentencing
guidelines. See Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 605-06 & n.1 (2007) (Alito, J., dissenting).
While this article includes some discussion of the Sixth Amendment, a more appropriate and
relevant historical starting point for the article is the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984. See
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, §§ 212-17, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified as amended
in 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-742 (2006), 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-98) [hereinafter 1984 Act].
760
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A. U.S. Sentencing Commission and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
As a prefatory comment, it bears mention that people routinely conflate
"sentencing guidelines" with "mandatory minimums."' 7  In order to avoid
confusion, it is imperative to understand that, while often overlapping, they
are indeed distinct. In 1984, Congress decided to abandon indeterminate
sentencing in favor of a more uniformed statutory scheme. 8 This decision
culminated in the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (the 1984 Act), which
provided for the creation of the United States Sentencing Commission (the
Commission),' 9 an independent agency of the Judicial Branch responsible
for the formulation of sentencing guidelines for federal criminal offenses.2 0
The Commission submitted its first Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual
to Congress in 1987.21
17. The Guidelines are published every year in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual. The
Guidelines assign a base offense level between 1 and 43 calculated by considering such factors as
the category of the offense, offense conduct, and the criminal history of the defendant. The offense
level can then be adjusted by considering other aggravating or mitigating circumstances. Each
offense level corresponds to a sentencing range. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
(2007). Mandatory minimum sentences, on the other hand, are prescribed by Congress under the
1984 Act. See 1984 Act, supra note 16. The mandatory minimum sentences are keyed to certain
amounts of particular drugs involved in trafficking crimes. Courts are only free to sentence below
these minimums if the defendant being sentenced provides substantial assistance to another criminal
prosecution. See infra note 22 (discussing "substantial assistance" departures).
18. Prior to the enactment of the 1984 Act, federal courts used a system of indeterminate
sentencing, which was highly discretionary and stressed rehabilitation. See Mistretta v. United
States, 488 U.S. 361, 363 (1989) ("For almost a century, the Federal Government employed in
criminal cases a system of indeterminate sentencing. Statutes specified the penalties for crimes but
nearly always gave the sentencing judge wide discretion to decide whether the offender should be
incarcerated and for how long, whether he should be fined and how much, and whether some lesser
restraint, such as probation, should be imposed instead of imprisonment or fine. This indeterminate-
sentencing system was supplemented by the utilization of parole, by which an offender was returned
to society under the 'guidance and control' of a parole officer." (citing Zerbst v. Kidwell, 304 U.S.
359, 363 (1938))). Congress grew wary of the severe sentencing disparities arising under such a
flexible system. Its disapproval culminated in the 1984 Act. See Michael Guasco, Note, Defining
"Ordinary Prudential Doctrines" After Booker: Why The Limited Remand Is The Least Of Many
Evils, 37 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 609, 611-12 (2007).
19. See 1984 Act, supra note 16; see also Kimbrough v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 558, 567 n.7
(2007) ("Congress created the Sentencing Commission and charged it with promulgating the
Guidelines in the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, but the first version of the Guidelines did not
become operative until November 1987" (citing U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SPECIAL REPORT TO
THE CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY, at ii-iv (1995), available at
http://www.ussc.gov/crack/exec.htm [hereinafter 1995 REPORT])).
20. See 1995 REPORT, supra note 19, at 2 (listing additional responsibilities of the Commission
as required under the 1984 Act, including monitoring and periodically reporting on the
Guidelines); 28 U.S.C. § 995(a)(8), (9), (12)(A), (13)-(16), (20), (21) (2000) (outlining powers and
responsibilities of the Commission).
21. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (1987).
In the interim, Congress passed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 (the
1986 Act), which promulgated an extensive list of mandatory minimum
sentences prescribed for designated federal drug trafficking offenses.2 2 The
Act created a two-tiered sentencing schedule for drug trafficking offenses,
with minimum sentences of five and ten years depending on the type of drug
and quantity, based on weight.23 Notably, the distribution of 5 grams of
crack cocaine or 500 grams of powder cocaine carried a mandatory
minimum sentence of five years in prison,24 and the distribution of 50 grams
of crack or 5000 grams of powder cocaine carried a mandatory minimum
sentence of ten years to life in prison.25  This sentencing disparity between
powder cocaine versus crack cocaine became known as the "100-to-i
quantity ratio. '26 Much speculation exists over why crack was punished so
much more harshly than other drugs, but the tipping point in the debate
22. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207. Perhaps the term
"mandatory minimum sentence" is a bit misleading. There are multiple authorities under which a
district court judge may depart from the Guidelines ranges, two of which authorize departure below
the "mandatory" minimum sentence. The "substantial assistance" provision of the Guidelines allows
a judge to sentence below the Guidelines. The "safety valve" provision of the Guidelines and the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure go further by granting the judge authority to sentence below the
mandatory minimum sentences. The safety valve provision allows for departures in cases involving
certain mitigating sentencing factors. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5CI.2(a)
(2007) ("[T]he court shall impose a sentence in accordance with the applicable guidelines without
regard to any statutory minimum sentence, if the court finds that the defendant meets the criteria in
18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1)-(5)... : '[Tihe defendant does not have more than I criminal history
point... ; the defendant did not use violence or credible threats of violence or possess a firearm or
other dangerous weapon... ; the offense did not result in death or serious bodily injury to any
person; the defendant was not an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor of others in the
offense... and was not engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise... ; and not later than the time
of the sentencing hearing, the defendant has truthfully provided to the Government all information
and evidence the defendant has concerning the offense or offenses that were part of the same course
of conduct or of a common scheme or plan .... ' (emphasis added)). The other instance in which a
sentencing court may depart below the mandatory minimum sentence is when granting a "Rule 35"
departure. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 35(b) ("Upon the government's motion.., the court may reduce a
sentence if the defendant, after sentencing, provided substantial assistance in investigating or
prosecuting another person.... When acting under [this section], the court may reduce the sentence
to a level below the minimum sentence established by statute." (emphasis added)). Lastly, a
sentencing court has the option of granting a "substantial assistance" departure, also called a
"51K.1" departure, in cases involving a defendant who provides substantial assistance to the
government in the prosecution of another. However, unlike the safety valve and Rule 35 departures,
a sentencing judge granting a substantial assistance departure pursuant to § 5K1 .1 of the Guidelines
is still bound by the statutory minimum sentence. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
§ 5K1.1 (2007) ("Upon motion of the government stating that the defendant has provided substantial
assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed an offense, the
court may depart from the guidelines." (emphasis added)).
23. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (2000).
24. § 841(b)(l)(B) (mandating a prison sentence of five to forty years for trafficking offenses
involving at least 5 grams of crack or 500 grams of powder cocaine).
25. § 841(b)(1)(A) (mandating a prison sentence of ten years to life for trafficking offenses
involving at least 50 grams of crack or 5 kilograms of powder cocaine).
26. See 1995 REPORT, supra note 19, at 5.
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occurred when young basketball star Len Bias died suddenly from crack use
in 1986 at the age of twenty-two. 2
The 100-to-I ratio established under Congress's mandatory minimum
sentencing regime was adopted by the Commission for use in the sentencing
calculation tables contained in its Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual.
2 8
However, use of the 100-to-I ratio was not limited to the amounts of cocaine
corresponding to the five- and ten-year mandatory minimum quantities;
instead, it was adopted across the board. 9 Congress further evidenced its
intent to deter crack offenses in passing the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988,
establishing a mandatory minimum sentence for simple possession of crack
cocaine.3 °
With this sentencing scheme in place, the disparity in cocaine
sentencing became more and more evident over the years.
31 On at least
27. See, e.g., Marc Mauer, Racial Impact Statements as a Means of Reducing Unwarranted
Sentencing Disparities, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 19, 20 (2007) ("The problem, at least as it was
perceived, was not a generalized one, but rather a racial one, pertaining to young black men. From
the cover of Newsweek, to stories on the nightly news, to pronouncements of members of Congress,
the image of a dark-skinned inner-city youth was the face of this new and seemingly intractable drug
problem. Already emotionally laden, the issue achieved high-profile status in the nation's capital
following the tragic death of (black) University of Maryland basketball star Len Bias in June of
1986. Following the NBA draft, at which he had been selected as the number two pick by the
Boston Celtics, Bias died of a drug overdose that evening while celebrating with friends. News
reports indicated that he had overdosed on crack cocaine, an error that was not repudiated until
months later when it was reported that he had in fact died from freebasing powder cocaine. Bias's
death ignited momentum in Congress to 'do something' about this new drug scourge. The hastily
crafted response called for harsh prison terms, and only harsh prison terms."); Richard B. Schmitt &
David G. Savage, Chipping at Tough Crack Sentencing, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 30, 2007, at A16
(discussing Bias's death as the catalyst for the enactment of strict crack sentences), available at
http://articles.latimes.com/2007/dec/30/nation/na-crack
3O.
28. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2DI.1, at 62 (1987) (prescribing 100-to-I ratio
between powder cocaine and crack).
29. See infra notes 229-230 and accompanying text (discussing the history of the Commission's
adoption of the 100-to-I ratio).
30. See 1995 REPORT, supra note 19, at 1-2 ("Congress also distinguished crack cocaine from
both powder cocaine and other controlled substances in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 by
creating a mandatory minimum penalty for simple possession of crack cocaine. This is the only
federal mandatory minimum for a first offense of simple possession of a controlled substance.
Under this law, possession of more than five grams of crack cocaine is punishable by a minimum of
five years in prison. Simple possession of any quantity of any other substance-including powder
cocaine-by first-time offenders is a misdemeanor offense punishable by no more than one year in
prison.").
31. It is important to point out at this juncture in the article that this project is intended to analyze
the state of the Guidelines post-KimbroughlGall. This article takes no particular stance on the
sociological issues raised. For a detailed discussion about cocaine and the 100-to-I quantity ratio,
see William Spade, Jr., Beyond the 100:1 Ratio: Towards a Rational Cocaine Sentencing Policy, 38
ARIZ. L. REv. 1233 (1996); Elizabeth Tison, Amending the Sentencing Guidelines for Cocaine
three separate occasions between the 1987 inception of the Guidelines and
2005, the Commission recommended to Congress that the crack/powder
ratio be reduced, but it never happened.32 Tired of waiting for Congress to
act, the Commission promulgated an "ameliorating" amendment to section
2D 1.1 of the Guidelines in April of 2007, aiming to reduce crack sentencing
base offense levels by two for each specified quantity.33  Absent
Offenses: The 100-to-I Ratio Is Not As "Cracked" Up As Some Suggest, 27 S. ILL. U. L.J. 413(2003). However, I would be remiss in failing to note a couple of my observations relating to the
Commission's most recent report to Congress. See U.S SENTENCING COMM'N, REPORT TO THE
CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY (2007), available at http://www.ussc.gov/
r_congress/cocaine2007.pdf [hereinafter 2007 REPORT]. The report's Appendix C contains written
public comments on the cocaine sentencing policy (advocating more lenient sentences for crack
offenses) from the U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Public and Community Defenders,
Practitioners' Advisory Group, National Council of La Raza and Mexican Legal Defense and
Educational Fund, the Sentencing Project, Human Rights Watch, American Civil Liberties Union,
Main Civil Liberties Union, Drug Policy Alliance, National African American Drug Policy
Coalition, Families Against Mandatory Minimums, 108 Law Professors, 308 University Professors
and Scholars, Students for Sensible Drug Policy, and individual citizens. See id. at app. C1-C7.
Collectively, this does not appear to be the most conservative group ever assembled. Additionally,
the government seems more concerned with clearing out prison space than equality in sentencing.
Appendix D of the 2007 Report is entitled "Sentencing Impact and Prison Impact Analysis." It
offers charts illustrating how many prison beds would be freed up if the ratio were reduced. For
example, a ratio of 5-to-I instead of 100-to-I (increasing the amount of crack cocaine necessary for
a five year mandatory minimum sentence to 100 grams) would result in a 13,343 "prison bed
reduction" over the next ten years. See id. at app. D7. Conspicuously absent is an appendix section
estimating the probability of crime surges resulting from the early release of drug traffickers from
federal prisons. There were, however, two comments from members of law enforcement who, not
surprisingly, are opposed to reducing sentences for crack-related offenses. On behalf of the U.S.
Department of Justice, United States Attorney R. Alexander Acosta testified:
There is substantial proof that crack cocaine is associated with violence to a greater
degree than other controlled substances, including powder cocaine.... The strong federal
sentencing guidelines are one of the best tools for law enforcement's efforts to stop
violent crime ... and reducing those sentences would created a risk of increased drug
violence.
Id. at app. B2-B4. Chuck Canterbury, the National President of the Fraternal Order of Police,
opposed any decrease in crack sentencing:
[T]he low level dealer who traffics in small amounts is no less of a danger to the
community than an individual at the manufacturing or wholesale level. The fact that they
are at the bottom of the drug distribution chain does not decrease the risk of violence or
the effect on quality of life associated with their activities.
Id. at app. B4-B5.
32. See infra note 222 (discussing the Commission's unsuccessful recommendations made in
attempts to eliminate any disparity in 1995, reduce the ratio to 5-to-1 in 1997, and reduce the ratio to
20-to-I in 2002).
33. See 2007 Report, supra note 31, at 9. The report explained the Commission's actions as
follows:
The Commission's strong desire for prompt legislative action notwithstanding, the
problems associated with the 100-to-1 drug quantity ratio as detailed in this report are so
urgent and compelling that on April 27, 2007, the Commission promulgated an
amendment to USSG § 2D1.1 to somewhat alleviate those problems. The Commission
concluded that the manner in which the Drug Quantity Table in USSG § 2DI.1 was
constructed to incorporate the statutory mandatory minimum penalties for crack cocaine
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congressional action, the amendment would become effective on November
1, 2007, per its terms. Congress remained silent and the amendment was
adopted. 34  The Commission noted that "[a]ny comprehensive solution [to
the crack/powder disparity would still] require[] appropriate legislative
action by Congress., 35 Even after the 2007 amendment, sentences for crack-
related offenses would still garner a sentence two to five times greater than
that of the same powder cocaine-related offenses. 36  As the Commission
struggled with the crack/powder disparity, a string of cases made its way up
to the Supreme Court, repeatedly altering the interpretation, and thus
application, of the Guidelines.
B. Jurisprudential Progeny of the Sentencing Guidelines
The first Supreme Court case to weigh in on the Guidelines was the
landmark constitutional law case of Mistretta v. United States.
37  In
Mistretta, two challenges were made to the creation of the Commission: that
it was an improper delegation of legislative power and that it violated the
separation of powers doctrine. 38 The issue arose after John Mistretta was
indicted in district court on federal cocaine trafficking charges in December
1987.39  He moved to have the newly enacted Guidelines ruled
offenses is an area in which the federal sentencing guidelines contribute to the problems
associated with the 100-to-I drug quantity ratio.
The amendment, which absent congressional action to the contrary will become effective
November 1, 2007, modifies the drug quantity thresholds in the Drug Quantity Table so
as to assign, for crack cocaine offenses, base offense levels corresponding to guideline
ranges that include the statutory mandatory minimum penalties (as opposed to guideline
ranges that exceed the statutory mandatory minimum penalties). Accordingly, pursuant
to the amendment, five grams of crack cocaine will be assigned a base offense level of 24
(51 to 63 months at Criminal History Category I, which includes the five-year (60 month)
statutory minimum for such offenses), and 50 grams of cocaine base will be assigned a
base offense level of 30 (97 to 121 months at Criminal History Category I, which
includes the ten-year (120 month) statutory minimum for such offenses). In order to
partially address some of the problems that are unique to crack cocaine offenses because
of the 100-to-i drug quantity ratio, crack cocaine quantities above and below the
mandatory minimum threshold quantities will be adjusted downward by two levels.
Id. (italicized emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
34. See infra note 223 (discussing Congress's tacit approval of the cocaine sentencing
amendment).
35. 2007 Report, supra note 31, at 10.
36. Kimbrough v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 558, 569 & nn.10- 1 (2007).
37. 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
38. Id. at 370.
39. Id. Mistretta was indicted in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Missouri on
three counts relating to the sale of cocaine. He ultimately pled guilty to one violation of 21 U.S.C.
unconstitutional, arguing the Guidelines were the product of the
Commission, which was established in violation of the separation of powers
doctrine, and because Congress lacked the authority to delegate its
legislative responsibilities to the Commission. 40  The case ended up before
the Supreme Court, which held the 1984 Act constitutional, 41 and thus the
Commission and its Guidelines were also deemed constitutional.42
The next challenge facing the Commission would be whether the
Guidelines could pass muster under the Sixth Amendment.43 This issue was
taken up in the Apprendi-Blakely--Booker line of cases. 44 In 2000, the
Apprendi Court was faced with a situation where a defendant pled guilty to
firearm possession offenses after shooting into the home of an African-
American family with apparent racial animus.45 The applicable New Jersey
§§ 846 and 841(b)(1)(B), conspiracy and agreement to distribute cocaine. Id. at 370. The
Government dismissed the remaining counts, and Mistretta was sentenced to eighteen months inprison with three years of supervised release under the Guidelines. Id. at 370-71.
40. Id. at 370. Although the district court rejected Mistretta's arguments, the district court judge
stated that its opinion "[did] not imply that [the judge had] no serious doubts about some parts of the
Sentencing Guidelines and the legality of their anticipated operation." Id.
41. See 1984 Act, supra note 16.
42. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 412 ("We conclude that in creating the Sentencing Commission-an
unusual hybrid in structure and authority-Congress neither delegated excessive legislative power
nor upset the constitutionally mandated balance of powers among the coordinate Branches. The
Constitution's structural protections do not prohibit Congress from delegating to an expert body
located within the Judicial Branch the intricate task of formulating sentencing guidelines consistent
with such significant statutory direction as is present here. Nor does our system of checked and
balanced authority prohibit Congress from calling upon the accumulated wisdom and experience of
the Judicial Branch in creating policy on a matter uniquely within the ken of judges. Accordingly,
we hold that the [Sentencing Reform Act of 1984] is constitutional."). But see id. at 427 (Scalia, J.,dissenting) ("I think ... this case is not about commingling, but about the creation of a new Branch
altogether, a sort of junior-varsity Congress. It may well be that in some circumstances such a
Branch would be desirable; perhaps the agency before us here will prove to be so. But there are
many desirable dispositions that do not accord with the constitutional structure we live under. And
in the long run the improvisation of a constitutional structure on the basis of currently perceived
utility will be disastrous.").
43. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment issue occurs in cases where judge-found
facts are considered in sentencing. For example, imagine a scenario in which the Guidelines
mandated a sentencing range of four years to six years for robbery. The (hypothetical) defendant
pled guilty to the robbery in district court. The U.S. attorney presented evidence that the robbery
was racially motivated and asked the judge to consider a "hate crime" sentencing enhancement of
three years. If the judge chose to apply the maximum enhancement, the defendant would be
sentenced to at least a year over the Guidelines range based on a fact (racial animus) that was not
proven to a jury or admitted to by the defendant. Many would say this runs afoul of the Sixth
Amendment.
44. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296(2004); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
45. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 468-71. Charles Apprendi, Jr. was arrested and admitted to the
shooting about an hour after it occurred. Id. at 469. The house was occupied by the first African-
American family to move into an all-white neighborhood. Id. Apprendi admitted that he did it
"because they [were] black in color [and] he [did] not want them in the neighborhood." Id. Pursuant
to a plea agreement, Apprendi was convicted on to two counts of firearm possession for an unlawful
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state sentencing statutes included a sentencing enhancement if the judge
concluded, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the crime was
committed to intimidate victims based on race.
6 The shooting crime alone
carried a sentencing range of five to ten years, but the enhancement carried
up to an additional ten years. 47  The sentencing judge found that Apprendi
qualified for the enhancement and sentenced him to twelve years in prison-
two years over the original sentencing range under the firearm offense.
4 8
Notwithstanding Apprendi's constitutional argument that application of
sentencing enhancement violated the Sixth Amendment, the state appellate
court and the New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed his sentence.
49  The
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the Sixth
Amendment issue. 50 In a 5-4 decision,5 the Court reversed, holding that
any fact other than a prior conviction that increases a defendant's sentence
beyond its statutory maximum must either be pled to by the defendant or
proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. 52
purpose and one count of possessing an antipersonnel bomb. Id. at 469-70 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 2C:39-4a, 2C:39-3a (West 1995)).
46. Id. at 468-69 ("A separate statute, described by [the New Jersey] Supreme Court as a 'hate
crime' law, provides for an 'extended term' of imprisonment if the trial judge finds, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that '[tihe defendant in committing the crime acted with a purpose to
intimidate an individual or group of individuals because of race, color, gender, handicap, religion,
sexual orientation or ethnicity.' The extended term authorized by the hate crime law for second-
degree offenses is imprisonment for 'between 10 and 20 years."' (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 2C:44-3(e), 2C:43-7(a)(3) (West Supp. 1999-2000))).
47. See supra note 46.
48. Id. at 471 ("Having found 'by a preponderance of the evidence' that Apprendi's actions were
taken 'with a purpose to intimidate' as provided by the statute, the trial judge held that the hate crime
enhancement applied. Rejecting Apprendi's constitutional challenge to the statute, the judge
sentenced him to a 12-year term of imprisonment on [one count of second-degree possession of a
firearm for an unlawful purpose], and to shorter concurrent sentences on the other two counts."
(citations omitted)).
49. Id. at 471-72.
50. Id. at 474.
5 1. As usual in cases dealing with federal sentencing, the court was fragmented. Justice Stevens
delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Justices Scalia, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg. Id. at
468. Justice Scalia filed a concurring opinion and joined parts I and II of Justice Thomas's
concurrence. Id. Justice O'Connor dissented, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Kennedy and Breyer. Id. Justice Breyer also dissented, joined by the Chief Justice. Id.
52. Id. at 475-76 ("The question whether Apprendi had a constitutional fight to have a jury find
[racial] bias on the basis of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is starkly presented. Our answer to that
question was foreshadowed by our opinion in Jones v. United States, construing a federal statute.
We there noted that 'under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the notice and jury
trial guarantees of the Sixth Amendment, any fact (other than prior conviction) that increases the
maximum penalty for a crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven
beyond a reasonable doubt.' The Fourteenth Amendment commands the same answer in this case
In 2004, the Court evidenced its commitment to Apprendi in Blakely v.
Washington.53 This case involved a defendant who had been sentenced to
more than three years above the state law statutory maximum prescribed for
the offense he pled guilty to, pursuant to a sentencing enhancement that
relied on a judge-found fact. 4 Consistent with its holding in Apprendi, the
Court ruled the sentence in Blakely violated the Sixth Amendment, this time
in the context of state law. 
55
In 2005, the Supreme Court decided the watershed case of United States
v. Booker.56 Not surprisingly, Booker is an appeal from a cocaine
conviction." By a confusing bare majority,58 the divided Court chose to
render the previously mandatory Guidelines effectively "advisory" and
establish an appellate review for "unreasonableness. '59 These changes were
involving a state statute." (citations omitted) (quoting Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 243 n.6
(1999))).
53. 542 U.S. 296 (2004). The "commitment" retained its 5-4 split. Id.
54. Id. at 298 ("Petitioner Ralph Howard Blakely, Jr., pleaded guilty to the kidnapping of his
estranged wife. The facts admitted in his plea, standing alone, supported a maximum sentence of 53
months. Pursuant to state law, the court imposed an 'exceptional' sentence of 90 months after
making a judicial determination that he had acted with 'deliberate cruelty."' (citation omitted)).
55. Id. at 313-14 ("Petitioner was sentenced to prison for more than three years beyond what the
law allowed for the crime to which he confessed, on the basis of a disputed finding that he had acted
with 'deliberate cruelty.' The Framers would not have thought it too much to demand that, before
depriving a man of three more years of his liberty, the State should suffer the modest inconvenience
of submitting its accusation to 'the unanimous suffrage of twelve of his equals and neighbours,'
rather than a lone employee of the State." (quoting WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES
*343)).
56. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
57. Booker incorporates United States v. Fanfan, No. 04-105 (U.S. Jan. 12, 2004). Freddie
Booker was convicted by a jury of"possession with intent to distribute at least 50 grams of [crack]",
in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Id. at 227. His sentencing under the Guidelines range would
have been from 210 to 260 months in prison but for a finding on the part of the sentencing judge that
he possessed 566 additional grams of crack and obstructed justice, thus raising his sentencing range
to 360 months to life. Id. In light of Apprendi and Blakely, the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding the
sentence increase based on judge-found facts violated the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 227-28. The
Government appealed. Id. at 229. Respondent Fanfan was convicted of "conspiracy to distribute
and to possess with intent to distribute at least 500 grams of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C.§§ 846, 841(a)(1), and 841(b)(1)(B)(ii)." Id. at 228. The Guidelines sentencing range in Fanfan's
case, based on his conviction, was from 188 to 235 months. Id. The judge made additional findings
that would have increased Fanfan's sentence by ten years. Id. However, relying on Blakely, thejudge chose only to consider the jury verdict in sentencing. Id. at 228-29. The Government filed for
appeal in the First Circuit and petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. Id. at 229. The
Supreme Court elected to resolve the issue presented in both cases together. Id.
58. The Booker Court was completely fractured. Justice Stevens delivered the majority opinion
in part, joined by Justices Scalia, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg. Id. at 225. Justice Breyer also
delivered the majority opinion in part, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor,
Kennedy, and Ginsburg. Id. Justice Stevens dissented in part, joined by Justices Souter and Scalia,
who joined except for Part III and footnote seventeen. Id. Both Justices Scalia and Thomas
dissented in part. Id. Justice Breyer also dissented in part, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, and
Justices O'Connor and Kennedy. Id.
59. The Court accomplished this conversion of the Guidelines from mandatory to advisory by
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intended to keep application of the Guidelines in compliance with the Sixth
Amendment.6 °
In 2006, the Court granted certiorari to two cases that would test the
Guidelines standards set forth in Booker.6' First, in Rita v. United States, a
decorated veteran was convicted of perjury and obstruction of justice based
on his conduct and statements connected with an investigation conducted by
the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives. 62 His sentencing
range calculated under the Guidelines was thirty-three to forty-one months.63
He petitioned for a sentence below the Guidelines, citing his ailing physical
condition, military service, education, employment record, lack of substance
abuse, and mental and emotional health. 4 The court sentenced Rita to the
low end of the Guidelines range, thirty-three months. 65  He appealed his
sentence, but the Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding that a sentence within the
Guidelines range is "presumptively reasonable. 66  The Supreme Court
excising two of its statutory provisions. See id. at 259 ("[W]e must sever and excise two specific
statutory provisions: the provision that requires sentencing courts to impose a sentence within the
applicable Guidelines range (in the absence of circumstances that justify a departure), and the
provision that sets forth standards of review on appeal, including de novo review of departures from
the applicable Guidelines range. With these two sections excised ... the remainder of the Act
satisfies the Court's constitutional requirements." (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (2006); 18 U.S.C.
§ 3742(e))). Further, the Court addressed standard of appellate review under the newly advisory
Guidelines, electing to excise the statutory de novo standard of review put in place by Congress in
2003. Id. at 260-61 (discussing its excision of§ 3742(e) in favor of a "reasonableness" standard that
had been in place prior to 2003). Later, the Court would assert this was a clear pronouncement of an
abuse-of-discretion standard of review, but there would be some debate over that assertion. See
infra note 109 (discussing the issue of how clear the Court was in its prescribed abuse-of-discretion
standard in Booker). How "advisory" were the Guidelines as the result of Booker? This would be
the central issue in Gall v. United States.
60. Booker, 543 U.S. at 226-227 ("We hold that both courts correctly concluded that the Sixth
Amendment as construed in Blakely does apply to the Sentencing Guidelines.... [l]n light of this
holding, two provisions of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (SRA) that have the effect of making
the Guidelines mandatory must be invalidated in order to allow the statute to operate in a manner
consistent with congressional intent."). After Booker, Justices Scalia, Souter, and Thomas would
repeatedly assert that the Court went too far in its remedial holding. See, e.g., infra notes 296-301
and accompanying text (quoting the three Justices in their disapproval of Booker).
61. See Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456 (2007); Claiborne v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2245
(2007) (mem.), vacating as moot, 439 F.3d 479 (8th Cir. 2006).
62. Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2459-60.
63. Id. at 2461.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 2462.
66. Id. ("On appeal, Rita argued that his 33-month sentence was 'unreasonable' because (1) it did
not adequately take account of 'the defendant's history and characteristics,' and (2) it 'is greater than
necessary to comply with the purposes of sentencing set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2).' The
Fourth Circuit observed that it must set aside a sentence that is not 'reasonable.' The Circuit stated
that 'a sentence imposed within the properly calculated Guidelines range ... is presumptively
769
granted certiorari and affirmed, agreeing with the Fourth Circuit's
presumption of reasonableness for sentences falling within the Guidelines. 67
In 2006, the Supreme Court also granted certiorari in another Guidelines
case-Claiborne v. United States.68  Prior to his untimely death,69 Mario
Claiborne was arrested in 2003 for attempting to sell crack to an undercover
police officer.7 ° He pled guilty to two counts of violating 21 U.S.C. §§
841(a)(1) and 844(a), possessing and distributing crack cocaine.7 The
applicable Guidelines range for his crimes was thirty-seven to forty-six
months in prison.72 Based on the now-advisory nature of the Guidelines, the
district court sentenced him to only fifteen months.73 The Government
appealed to the Eighth Circuit, who remanded for re-sentencing, citing its
established rule that "[a]n extraordinary reduction must be supported by
extraordinary circumstances. ' ' 74  Claiborne was granted certiorari by the
Supreme Court.7' The Court heard oral arguments in Claiborne in February
of 2007, but in a strange turn of events, Claibome was shot and killed during
the commission of a vehicle theft before the Court could rule on his case.76
Nevertheless, the Eighth Circuit's holding in Claiborne would be addressed
as one of the issues before the Court in its next set of Guidelines cases, Gall
v. United States and Kimbrough v. United States.77
reasonable.' It added that 'while we believe that the appropriate circumstances for imposing a
sentence outside the guideline range will depend on the facts of individual cases, we have no reason
to doubt that most sentences will continue to fall within the applicable guideline range.' The Fourth
Circuit then rejected Rita's arguments and upheld the sentence." (internal citations omitted)).
67. Id. at 2462.
68. 127 S. Ct. 2245 (2007) (mem.), vacating as moot, 439 F.3d 479 (8th Cir. 2006).
69. See Allison Retka, U.S. Supreme Court Drops Case After Local Murder, ST. Louis DAILY
RECORD, June 5, 2007.
70. Claiborne, 439 F.3d 479, 480 (2006).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. ("Recognizing that the guidelines are advisory under United States v. Booker, the district
court sentenced Claiborne to 15 months in prison, concluding that 'the 37 month low end of the
range is, in my view, excessive' because of Claiborne's lack of criminal history, young age, the
small quantity of drugs involved, and the court's opinion that Claiborne was not likely to commit
similar crimes in the future.").
74. Id. at 481 (quoting United States v. Dalton, 404 F.3d 1029, 1033 (8th Cir. 2005)).
75. See Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 591 (2007) ("We did not have the opportunity to
answer [the question in Claiborne] because the case was mooted by Claiborne's untimely death."(citing Claiborne v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2245 (2007) (per curiam))).
76. Claiborne, having been released on his reduced prison sentence, was shot and killed during
an attempted vehicle theft at a gas station in St. Louis. See Retka, supra note 69.
77. Kimbrough v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 558 (2007); Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586
(2007).
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III. A CLOSE LOOK AT GALL v. UNITED STATES AND KMBROUGH V. UNITED
STATES
Both cases were argued on October 2, 2007, and both were decided on
December 10, 2007. Full comprehension of the Court's opinion in
Kimbrough would be difficult were it not read in light of Gall. Gall
addresses the larger general issue of departures from the Guidelines and
standard of appellate review for such departures.78 It also resolves the
Claiborne issue of whether a district court may depart from the applicable
Guidelines range without adherence to a scheme or test that balances the
extent of departure with the gravity of the circumstances involved.79 The
more focused question raised in Kimbrough is whether "a
sentence ... outside the guidelines range is per se unreasonable when it is
based on a disagreement with the sentencing disparity for crack and powder
cocaine offenses.",80 Following is a thorough examination and analysis of
both cases.




In the early part of 2000, Brian Gall was struggling with alcohol and
drug use while attending the University of Iowa as a sophomore. 83  He
joined in an ongoing enterprise with Luke Rinderknecht and others in the
distribution of a controlled substance known as "ecstasy., 84 For the next
seven months, Gall received ecstasy pills from Rinderknecht and delivered
them to co-conspirators, who sold them to users. 85 These transactions were
lucrative, netting Gall over $30,000.86
78. See Gall, 128 S. Ct. 586.
79. Id.; see also supra notes 68-76 and accompanying text (explaining the issue raised in
Claiborne).
80. United States v. Kimbrough, 174 F. App'x 798 (4th Cir. 2006), rev'd, 128 S. Ct. 558 (2007).
81. 128 S. Ct. 586 (2007).
82. Id. at 591-94.
83. Id. at 591-92 (explaining that Gall was using ecstacy, cocaine, and marijuana at the time);
Brief for the Petitioner at 2, Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586 (2007) (No. 06-7949), 2007 WL
2197584.
84. Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 591-92. The Court noted the drug "ecstasy" is also referred to as
"MDMA," which is short for its scientific name of "methylenedioxymethamphetamine." Id. at 592
n.l.
85. id. at 592.
86. Id.
Gall quit using ecstasy within a couple of months of joining in the
conspiracy. 7 In September of 2000, about seven months after first entering
into the criminal enterprise, Gall withdrew his participation. 8 After
graduating in 2002, he moved to Arizona and began working in construction,
successfully achieving the status of master carpenter.89
About a year later, Gall was questioned by federal law enforcement
agents.90 He admitted his participation in the conspiracy, but no immediate
action was taken against him. 9' In April 2004, Gall was indicted in district
court for "participating in a conspiracy to distribute ecstasy, cocaine, and
marijuana, that began in or about May 1996 and continued through October
30, 2002.' '92 Gall then moved back to Iowa, was released by the court on his
own recognizance, and started a successful construction business.93
Gall pled guilty to the conspiracy, "stipulating that he was 'responsible
for, but did not necessarily distribute himself, at least 2,500 grams of
[ecstasy], or the equivalent of at least 87.5 kilograms of marijuana.' ' 94
Considering all of the mitigating factors in Gall's case, the probation officer
issued a presentence report recommending "a sentencing range of 30 to 37
months of imprisonment." 95  During the sentencing hearing on May 27,
87. Id.
88. Id. The descriptions offered by Petitioner and Respondent of the "withdrawal" by Gall from
the conspiracy are in stark contrast. Compare Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 83, at 2 ("Mr. Gall
then decided to change his life. Intending to focus on his classes, he stopped using drugs and alcohol
in September 2000. He scheduled a meeting with Mr. Rinderknecht and declared that 'he was
getting out of the drug business and wanted nothing more to do with the conspiracy."' (citation
omitted)), with Brief for the United States at 3, Gall, 128 S. Ct. 586 (No. 06-7949), 2007 WL
2406805 ("By September 2000, petitioner became worried about the risks involved in continuing to
participate in the conspiracy. He informed Rinderknecht that month that he no longer wanted to be
involved because he was very nervous that [one of the other co-conspirators] was telling too many
people about the business." (citation omitted)).
89. Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 592. It is interesting that the Court parroted the district court's
characterization of Gall as "self-rehabilitated." Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. The Court pointed out that the indictment was issued about a year and a half after Gall's
initial interview with federal law enforcement and three and a half years after Gall's withdrawal
from the conspiracy. Id. Gall and seven other defendants were indicted by the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of Iowa. Id.; see also United States v. Gall, 374 F. Supp. 2d 758 (S.D. Iowa
2005).
93. Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 592. Gall moved back to Iowa upon receipt of notice of the indictment.
Id. While freed on his own recognizance, he started up his own construction business, mainly
subcontract installation of doors and windows. Id. He was making over $2000 profit a month. Id.
94. Id. In the plea agreement, the Government noted Gall's withdrawal from the conspiracy. Id.
95. Id. at 592-93 ("In her presentence report, the probation officer concluded that Gall had no
significant criminal history; that he was not an organizer, leader, or manager; and that his offense did
not involve the use of any weapons. The report stated that Gall had truthfully provided the
Government with all of the evidence he had concerning the alleged offenses, but that his evidence
was not useful because he provided no new information to the agents. The report also described
Gall's substantial use of drugs prior to his offense and the absence of any such use in recent years.").
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2005, the assistant U.S. attorney urged the judge to sentence Gall within the
Guidelines range, notwithstanding the voluminous character rehabilitation
evidence offered by Gall. 96 The judge, after discussing the thirty and thirty-
five month prison sentences of two of Gall's co-conspirators who had not
withdrawn voluntarily from the conspiracy, sentenced Gall to thirty-six
months probation. 97
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed the
district court, citing its previous holding in United States v. Claiborne,8 that
"a sentence outside of the Guidelines range must be supported by a
justification that 'is proportional to the extent of the difference between the
advisory range and the sentence imposed."' 99  The Eighth Circuit
characterized the district court's departure from the Guidelines in Gall from
thirty months imprisonment to probation as "a 100% downward variance,"
and therefore "extraordinary." °  Under the Eighth Circuit's rule in
96. Id. at 593 (recognizing the "'small flood' of letters [introduced on the record at the
sentencing hearing] from Gall's parents and other relatives, his fiance[e], neighbors, and
representatives of firms doing business with him, uniformly praising his character and work ethic").
97. Id. The district court judge not only made a long and detailed statement on the record, but
also filed a "detailed sentencing memorandum explaining his decision." Id. He reminded Gall,
more than once, of the seriousness of probation and the consequences of violating the terms of his
probation. Id. Finally, the judge explained why he was not sentencing Gall to a prison term:
Any term of imprisonment in this case would be counter effective by depriving society of
the contributions of the Defendant who, the Court has found, understands the
consequences of his criminal conduct and is doing everything in his power to forge a new
life. The Defendant's post-offense conduct indicates neither that he will return to
criminal behavior nor that the Defendant is a danger to society. In fact, the Defendant's
post-offense conduct was not motivated by a desire to please the Court or any other
governmental agency, but was the pre-Indictment product of the Defendant's own desire
to lead a better life.
Id. Apparently the district court judge found the petitioner's argument more persuasive than the
Government's. See supra note 88 (discussing different characterizations of Gall's "voluntary"
withdrawal from the conspiracy).
98. 439 F.3d 479 (8th Cir. 2006) (holding defendant's fifteen-month sentence for possession and
distribution of rock cocaine was unreasonable downward departure from the Guidelines range of
thirty-seven to forty-six months). In Claiborne, the Eighth Circuit relied on its earlier rule from
Dalton that "[ain extraordinary reduction must be supported by extraordinary circumstances." Id. at
481 (quoting United States v. Dalton, 404 F.3d 1029, 1033 (8th Cir. 2005)).
99. Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 594 (quoting United States v. Gall, 446 F.3d 884, 889 (8th Cir. 2006), in
turn quoting Claiborne, 439 F.3d 479, 481 (8th Cir. 2006)).
100. Id. (quoting Gall, 446 F.3d at 889). The Supreme Court criticized the Eighth Circuit's
analysis, noting that:
Rather than making an attempt to quantify the value of the justifications provided by the
District Judge, the Court of Appeals identified what it regarded as five separate errors in
the District Judge's reasoning: (1) He gave "too much weight to Gall's withdrawal from
the conspiracy"; (2) given that Gall was 21 at the time of his offense, the District Judge
erroneously gave "significant weight" to studies showing impetuous behavior by persons
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Claiborne,'' such an "extraordinary" departure requires extraordinary
circumstances, which were not present in this case.' °2 The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari to "explain why the Court of Appeals' rule
requiring 'proportional' justifications for departures from the Guidelines
range is not consistent with [the Supreme Court's] remedial opinion in[Booker]." 103
2. Analysis and Critique
a. Justice Stevens's Majority Opinion10 4
The Supreme Court, in a 7-2 decision, '0' reversed the Eighth Circuit's
holding in Gall, finding that the district court had not abused its discretion in
sentencing Gall below the sentencing range under the Guidelines. 0 6  In
doing so, the Court cleared up any ambiguity as to its intent in Booker,'07
answering important questions left in the wake of its remedial decision. 105
First, the Court held that federal appellate courts must use the abuse-of-
discretion standard in conducting an appellate review of sentences, whether
or not those sentences fall within the Guidelines.' 09 Second, district courts
under the age of 18; (3) he did not "properly weigh" the seriousness of Gall's offense; (4)
he failed to consider whether a sentence of probation would result in "unwarranted"
disparities; and (5) he placed "too much emphasis on Gall's post-offense rehabilitation."
Id. (quoting Gall, 446 F.3d at 889-90).
101. Claiborne, 439 F.3d 479.
102. Id.; see also supra note 98 (discussing the Eighth Circuit's proportionality rule for Guidelines
departures).
103. Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 594 (citing United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005)).
104. Id. at 594-602.
105. Id. Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and
Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Id. Justices Scalia and Souter filed separate
concurring opinions. Id. Justices Thomas and Alito wrote separate dissenting opinions. Id. It is
interesting to note that Justice Breyer, having authored Booker, simply joins the majority in Gall, not
putting pen to paper.
106. Id. at 602. The Court found that the district court had committed "no procedural error" and
the "Court of Appeals' decision to the contrary was incorrect and failed to demonstrate the requisite
deference to the District Judge's decision." Id. at 600.
107. 543 U.S. 220; see also supra notes 56-60 and accompanying text (discussing Booker).
108. It is important to understand that the Court uses its opinion in Gall, in part, to clarify its
holding in Booker and instruct district and appellate courts on application of the "advisory"
Guidelines post-Booker. District courts were beginning to devise "mathematical" rules for
determining reasonable variance from the Guidelines. See Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 595; see also United
States v. Claiborne, 439 F.3d 479, 484 (8th Cir. 2006) (requiring the district court to show
extraordinary circumstances to support an extraordinary degree of variance from the Guidelines).
The Seventh Circuit also applied a proportionality test, albeit with more colorful language. See
United States v. Wallace, 458 F.3d 606, 614 (7th Cir. 2006) (vacating a sentence handed down by a
district court that had departed from the Guidelines in giving the defendant a "'World Series' break"
because "[s]uch a break requires ... a 'World Series' explanation").
109. Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 594 ("Our explanation of 'reasonableness' review in the Booker opinion
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must seriously consider the extent of departure from the Guidelines and
sufficiently articulate justifications for such departures." °  The decision
addressed both the responsibilities of the trial courts in sentencing and the
role of the appellate courts in reviewing those sentences.
After a cursory discussion of the standard of review and general
importance of the Guidelines, the Court turns to assessing the reasonableness
of sentences falling outside the Guidelines range."' While district courts
must consider the extent of their departure from the Guidelines, they are not
bound by any mathematical sentencing scheme or matrix in justifying the
departure in any particular case."12 Specifically, the Court rejects the rigid
rule requiring "'extraordinary' circumstances to justify a sentence outside
the Guidelines range.""' 3  Further, just because the Court established a
made it pellucidly clear that the familiar abuse-of-discretion standard of review now applies to
appellate review of sentencing decisions." (citing Booker, 543 U.S. at 260-62)). Here, the Court
seems to mischaracterize the clarity of its earlier opinion in Booker. Nowhere in the Booker opinion
will the reader find the term "abuse-of-discretion," certainly not on pages 260-262. Moreover, even
at the time Booker was penned, Justice Scalia criticized the majority's "reasonableness" standard of
review as vague. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 312 (Scalia, J., dissenting in part) ("What I anticipate will
happen is that 'unreasonableness' review will produce a discordant symphony of different standards,
varying from court to court and judge to judge, giving the lie to the remedial majority's sanguine
claim that 'no feature' of its avant-garde Guidelines system will 'ten[d] to hinder' the avoidance of
,excessive sentencing disparities."' (citations omitted)). It suffices to say that Justice Alito did not
find the standards set forth in Booker for appellate review of sentencing decisions to be "pellucidly
clear." See Gall 128 S. Ct. at 603 (Alito, J., dissenting) ("The Booker remedial opinion did not
explain exactly what it meant by a system of 'advisory' guidelines or by 'reasonableness' review,
and the opinion is open to different interpretations." (quoting Booker, 543 U.S. at 245-62)).
110. Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 594 ("[E]ven though the Guidelines are advisory rather than mandatory,
they are... the product of careful study based on extensive empirical evidence derived from the
review of thousands of individual sentencing decisions." (citing Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct.
2456 (2007))).
111. Id. at 594-95.
112. The Supreme Court disapproves of the developing trend among federal appellate courts of
formulating mathematical rubrics designed to evaluate the reasonableness of Guidelines departures.
Compare United States v. Gall, 446 F.3d 884, 889 (2006) ("Here, the district court imposed a
sentence of probation when the bottom of Gall's advisory Guidelines range was 30 months
incarceration. In essence, this amounts to a 100% downward variance, as Gall will not serve any
prison time. Such a variance is extraordinary."), and Claiborne, 439 F.3d at 481 ("Here, the district
court imposed a 15-month sentence when the bottom of Claiborne's advisory guidelines range was
37 months. This is a sixty percent downward variance."), with Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 595 ("The
mathematical approach also suffers from infirmities of application. On one side of the equation,
deviations from the Guidelines range will always appear more extreme-in percentage terms-when
the range itself is low, and a sentence of probation will always be a 100% departure regardless of
whether the Guidelines range is I month or 100 years."). Ultimately, the alternative offered by the
Court varies only in diction. See infra note 286 (comparing the Gall Court's standard for evaluating
Guidelines departures with that of the Eighth Circuit's standard in Claiborne).
113. Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 595.
"presumption of reasonableness" in sentences within the Guidelines, 114 there
is no "presumption of unreasonableness" for sentences outside the
Guidelines." 5
During the majority's rebuke of the mathematical approach, it takes a
detour to discuss the "severity" of being sentenced to probation." 6 While
the language of the cases cited for support in this endeavor is compelling,
the effectiveness of Justice Stevens's implicit assertion that the oppressive
hardship of probation is somehow comparable to several years in federal
prison is a tenuous argument at best. 1 7
Turning back to the mathematical approach, the Court explains the
difficulty of assigning numbers and percentages to a defendant's actions for
114. See Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456 (2007).
115. Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 595. While the Court did not cite any appellate cases that adopted a
presumption of unreasonableness for sentences falling outside the Guidelines, it opined that some
approaches appeared to be coming close to such a presumption. The Court noted several cases
previously rejecting a presumption of unreasonableness. Id. at 595 n.3 (citing United States v.
Howard, 454 F.3d 700, 703 (7th Cir. 2006) ("Although a sentence outside the range does not enjoy
the presumption of reasonableness that one within the range does, it does not warrant a presumption
of unreasonableness."); United States v. Matheny, 450 F.3d 633, 642 (6th Cir. 2006) ("[T]his court's
holding that sentences within the advisory guideline range are presumptively reasonable does not
mean that sentences outside of that range are presumptively unreasonable."); United States v. Myers,
439 F.3d 415, 417 (8th Cir. 2006) ("We have determined that a sentence imposed within the
guidelines range is presumptively reasonable. While it does not follow that a sentence outside the
guidelines range is unreasonable, we review a district court's decision to depart from the appropriate
guidelines range for abuse of discretion." (citation omitted))).
116. Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 595-96. The Court begins its digression by "recogniz[ing] that custodial
sentences are qualitatively more severe than probationary sentences of equivalent terms." Id. at 595.
This seems like an enormous understatement. Many would argue that custodial sentences are
qualitatively more severe than probationary sentences of almost any term.
117. Id. at 595-96 & n.4 (quoting United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 119 (2001) ("Inherent
in the very nature of probation is that probationers 'do not enjoy the absolute liberty to which every
citizen is entitled."'); ADVISORY COUNCIL OF JUDGES OF NATIONAL COUNCIL ON CRIME AND
DELINQUENCY, GUIDES FOR SENTENCING 13-14 (1957) ("Probation is not granted out of a spirit of
leniency.... As the Wickersham Commission said, probation is not merely 'letting an offender off
easily."'); I NEIL P. COHEN, THE LAW OF PROBATION AND PAROLE § 7:9 (2d ed. 1999) ("[T]he
probation or parole conditions imposed on an individual can have a significant impact on both that
person and society .... Often these conditions comprehensively regulate significant facets of their
day-to-day lives .... They may become subject to frequent searches by government officials, as
well as to mandatory counseling sessions with a caseworker or psychotherapist.")). The majority
discusses the burdens placed on probationers:
Probationers may not leave the judicial district, move, or change jobs without notifying,
and in some cases receiving permission from, their probation officer or the court. They
must report regularly to their probation officer, permit unannounced visits to their homes,
refrain from associating with any person convicted of a felony, and refrain from
excessive drinking. Most probationers are also subject to individual "special conditions"
imposed by the court. Gall, for instance, may not patronize any establishment that
derives more than 50% of its revenue from the sale of alcohol, and must submit to
random drug tests as directed by his probation officer.
Id. (citations omitted).
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sentencing purposes.'" While this argument is sound, it somewhat
mischaracterizes the Eighth Circuit's analysis of Gall." 9  Justice Alito
colorfully describes this in his dissent as "attack[ing] straw men." 2 '
The Court outlines the procedures to be followed under Rita in
calculating Guidelines ranges, stressing that the "Guidelines should be the
starting point and the initial benchmark" but "are not the only
consideration."' 2' After both parties are given the opportunity to argue their
positions, the judge must consider all of the factors under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a). 2 2  The judge then "must make an individualized assessment
based on the facts presented," and if the judge determines a sentence outside
of the Guidelines, he "must consider the extent of the deviation and ensure
that the justification is sufficiently compelling to support the degree of the
variance."' 2'  Finally, the judge must "adequately explain the chosen
sentence to allow for meaningful appellate review and to promote the
118. Id. at 596. The Court calls using such a mathematical formula for determining a proper
sentence "attempting to measure an inventory of apples by counting oranges." Id. Idioms are in no
short supply in the hallowed halls of the Supreme Court. See infra note 120 and accompanying text
(defining the term "straw man" as used by Justice Alito in his dissent).
119. See United States v. Gall, 446 F.3d 884 (8th Cir. 2006); see also infra note 190 (discussing
Justice Alito's criticism of the characterization offered by the majority of the Eighth Circuit's
holding in Gall).
120. Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 609 (Alito J., dissenting). Straw man is defined as "[a] tenuous and
exaggerated counterargument that an advocate puts forth for the sole purpose of disproving it."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1461 (8th ed. 2004). Here, the majority creates a position that is easy to
refute (the precision of percentages in sentencing) and then attributes that position to the Eighth
Circuit. A straw man argument can be a successful rhetorical technique in that it is persuasive, but it
is misleading because the opponent's actual argument has not been addressed.
121. Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 596 (citing Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456 (2007)).
122. Id. at 596-97 & n.6. ("Section 3553(a) lists seven factors that a sentencing court must
consider. The first factor is a broad command to consider 'the nature and circumstances of the
offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant.' 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). The second
factor requires the consideration of the general purposes of sentencing, including: 'the need for the
sentence imposed-(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and
to provide just punishment for the offense; (B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; (C)
to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and (D) to provide the defendant with
needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most
effective manner.' § 3553(a)(2). The third factor pertains to 'the kinds of sentences available,'
§ 3553(a)(3); the fourth to the Sentencing Guidelines; the fifth to any relevant policy statement
issued by the Sentencing Commission; the sixth to 'the need to avoid unwarranted sentence
disparities,' § 3553(a)(6); and the seventh to 'the need to provide restitution to any victim,'
§ 3553(a)(7). Preceding this list is a general directive to 'impose a sentence sufficient, but not
greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes' of sentencing described in the second factor.
§ 3553(a)." (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006))).
123. Id. at 597 (citing Rita, 127 S. Ct. 2456).
perception of fair sentencing." 124 In other words, it appears that in departing
from the Guidelines, the judge must not only explain the reasonableness of
the sentence but must do so in the context of the extent of the departure. ' 25
After outlining the proper procedures for calculating a reasonable
sentence under the Guidelines, the Court begins a detailed discussion of the
abuse-of-discretion standard in reviewing sentences. 126 The Court declares
that "[r]egardless of whether the sentence imposed is inside or outside the
Guidelines range, the appellate court must review the sentence under an
abuse-of-discretion standard." 127 So as to leave no stone unturned, the Court
provides an extensive explanation of what constitutes procedural error. 128
Under the abuse-of-discretion standard, if no procedural error exists, the
appellate court then looks to reasonableness. 12 9  Under Rita, the court can
choose to "apply a presumption of reasonableness."' 130  However, if the
sentence falls outside of the Guidelines, there is no presumption of
unreasonableness.' 3 ' The court must then consider the extent from the
Guidelines, giving due deference to the § 3553(a) factors. 132
Turning to Gall's appellate record, the Supreme Court begins its
deconstruction of the Eighth Circuit's review by first noting that the district
court did not commit procedural error. 133  The Court then expresses its
disagreement with the appellate court's holding that the district court failed
"to give proper weight to the seriousness of the offense ... and fail[ed] to
consider whether a sentence of probation would create unwanted
124. Id.
125. Certainly, it would not "promote the perception of fair sentencing" for the judge to "consider
the extent of the deviation and ensure that the justification is sufficiently compelling to support the
degree of the variance" without explaining that justification on the record. See id.
126. Id. The Court considers both procedural error and substantive unreasonableness of the
sentence, either of which could constitute an abuse-of-discretion on the part of the sentencing court.
Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. The court lists the following six instances as constituting procedural error in federal
sentencing under the Guidelines: (1) failing to calculate the Guidelines range; (2) improperly
calculating the Guidelines range; (3) treating the Guidelines as mandatory; (4) failing to consider the
§ 3553(a) factors; (5) selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts; or (6) failing to
sufficiently explain the chosen sentence, including an explanation for deviating from the Guidelines
range. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. (citing Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456 (2007)).
131. See Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2467 ("The fact that we permit courts of appeals to adopt a
presumption of reasonableness does not mean that courts may adopt a presumption of
unreasonableness.").
132. Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 597 ("The fact that the appellate court might reasonably have concluded
that a different sentence was appropriate is insufficient to justify reversal of the district court."). As
the majority later alludes, this seems to have been the approach taken by the Eighth Circuit. See id.
at 600; see also supra note 122 (listing all of the factors under § 3553(a)).
133. Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 598.
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disparities." ' The record in fact showed that the district court judge did
discuss the severity of the offense involved and the likelihood of a resulting
unwarranted sentencing disparity. '35
Finally, the Court moves on to the issue of the reasonableness of Gall's
sentence, beginning with a criticism of the Eighth Circuit's lack of deference
to the district court. 136 Interestingly, the Court goes further by endorsing the
district court's reliance on factors that would normally be irrelevant in
calculating its sentence under the Guidelines,137 such as Gall's age and the
fact that Gall's illegal behavior stemmed from drug and alcohol addiction. 
131
134. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A) (2006) (requiring judges to consider "the need for the
sentence imposed.., to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to
provide just punishment for the offense"); 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) (requiring judges to consider "the
need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have
been found guilty of similar conduct")).
135. Id. at 598-600 ("[lit is perfectly clear that the District Judge considered the need to avoid
unwarranted disparities, but also considered the need to avoid unwarranted similarities among other
co-conspirators who were not similarly situated.... We also note that neither the Court of Appeals
nor the Government has called our attention to a comparable defendant who received a more severe
sentence.").
136. Id. at 600 ("The Court of Appeals gave virtually no deference to the District Court's decision
that the [factors under § 3553(a)] justified a significant variance in this case. Although the Court of
Appeals correctly stated that the appropriate standard of review was abuse of discretion, it engaged
in an analysis that more closely resembled de novo review of the facts presented and determined
that, in its view, the degree of variance was not warranted.").
137. 28 U.S.C. § 994(d) states the following:
The Commission in establishing categories of defendants for use in the guidelines and
policy statements governing the imposition of sentences... shall consider whether [age,
along with other factors] ... with respect to a defendant, have any relevance to the
nature, extent, place of service, or other incidents of an appropriate sentence, and shall
take them into account only to the extent that they do have relevance ....
28 U.S.C. § 994(d) (2000) (emphasis added); see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
§ 5HI.1 (2007) ("Age (including youth) is not ordinarily relevant in determining whether a
departure is warranted. Age may be a reason to depart downward in a case in which the defendant is
elderly and infirm and where a form of punishment such as home confinement might be equally
efficient as and less costly than incarceration." (emphasis added)); id. § 5HI.4 ("Drug or alcohol
dependence or abuse is not a reason for a downward departure. Substance abuse is highly
correlated to an increased propensity to commit crime." (emphasis added)).
138. Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 601. This is an important point, albeit a confusing one. The majority
accomplishes its subterfuge by essentially conflating issues raised by the district court. First, the
majority points out that "[tihe Court of Appeals thought the District Judge 'gave significant weight
to an improper factor' when he compared Gall's sale of ecstasy when he was a 21-year-old adult to
the 'impetuous and ill-considered' actions of persons under the age of 18." Id. (quoting Gall v.
United States, 446 F.3d 884, 884 (8th Cir. 2007)). Next, the Court concedes that the "appellate court
correctly observed that the studies cited by the District Judge do not explain how Gall's 'specific
behavior in the instant case was impetuous or ill-considered.' In that portion of his sentencing
memorandum, however, the judge was discussing the 'character of the defendant,' not the nature of
his offense." Id. (citation omitted). So here, if immaturity had been shown, it would be relevant as a
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Under § 3553(a), the sentencing court must consider the "history and
characteristics of the defendant."'139 In an attempt to bolster its support for
the district court's opinion, the majority goes into a lengthy discussion that
basically equates age with maturity. 40 Apparently, according to the district
court and now the Supreme Court, being under twenty-five years old may
now be a good excuse for selling drugs. The Court quotes the district court's
assertion that:
Immaturity at the time of the offense conduct is not an
inconsequential consideration. Recent studies on the development
of the human brain conclude that human brain development may not
become complete until the age of twenty-five.... [T]he recent
[National Institute of Health] report confirms that there is no bold
line demarcating at what age a person reaches full maturity. While
age does not excuse behavior, a sentencing court should account for
age when inquiring into the conduct of a defendant. 141
So is age, as opposed to maturity, now a "characteristic of the
defendant," and therefore a sentencing factor under the Guidelines? If so,
perhaps the National Institute of Health should be granted a seat on the
United States Sentencing Commission. Moreover, the Supreme Court
recognizes the district court's citation of a Skinnerian study from Roper v.
Simmons, a case more than distinguishable from Gall. 14' Roper is a juvenile
characteristic of the defendant, However, the Court quotes the district judge's "biology lecture" on
age and maturity, which ends with the declaration that "[w]hile age does not excuse behavior, a
sentencing court should account for age when inquiring into the conduct of a defendant." Id.(emphasis added). Few would argue that age should be inquired into in assessing conduct.
However, in this case, the conduct is stipulated to. Somehow, the majority manages to turn "age"
into "maturity" and "conduct" into "characteristic." In the end of this tangential and perplexing
analysis, the Court seems to arrive at the conclusion that the simple fact that Gall was only twenty-
one at the time he sold drugs means that he must have been immature, ipso facto age becomes a
mitigating factor in his sentencing.
139. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1).
140. See supra note 138.
141. Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 601 (emphasis added); see also supra note 138. Again, of course age
should be considered when evaluating the "conduct of the defendant." However, should it really be
considered a "characteristic" of the defendant for the purposes of sentencing? The court does not
state it expressly, but effectively arrives at the same conclusion in its analysis.
142. Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 601 ("The District Judge appended a long footnote to his discussion of
Gall's immaturity. The footnote includes an excerpt from our opinion in Roper v. Simmons, which
quotes a study stating that a lack of maturity and an undeveloped sense of responsibility are qualities
that 'often result in impetuous and ill-considered actions.' The District Judge clearly stated the
relevance of these studies ..." (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005))). This quote
from Roper is intended to illustrate the immaturity level of juveniles in relation to adults, not to
support the premise that twenty-one-year-old drug traffickers should be given a break because
perhaps they were impetuous. It becomes much more evident when read in its entirety. See Roper,
543 U.S. at 569 ("First, as any parent knows and as the scientific and sociological studies respondent
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death penalty case in which all of the immaturity discussion involves
contrasting the maturity level of juveniles from that of adults. 143 Petitioner
in Roper was seventeen years old when he committed his crime, while Gall
was twenty-one.'" So the Court chooses not to demarcate using the legal
standard of eighteen years old, but instead draws an arbitrary line based on
appellate review of the facts. At any rate, the Court had already made its
point and would have been better served sticking with its sound legal
analysis regarding the importance of judicial discretion in sentencing and
leaving the evolutionary psychology to the scientists. 1
45
The majority opinion closes by criticizing the error on the part of the
appellate court in conducting what it called an abuse-of-discretion review,
but was effectively tantamount to a de novo review. 46 The Court chastised
the appellate court for failing to give due deference to the district court and
accordingly reversed. 147
and his amici cite tend to confirm, '[a] lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of
responsibility are found in youth more often than in adults and are more understandable among the
young. These qualities often result in impetuous and ill-considered actions and decisions."' (quoting
Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993))). If one continues down the rabbit hole, he will notice
that Johnson is also a death penalty case, where perhaps consideration of mitigating factors is
exceedingly important. See Johnson, 509 U.S. at 367 ("A lack of maturity and an underdeveloped
sense of responsibility are found in youth more often than in adults and are more understandable
among the young. These qualities often result in impetuous and ill-considered actions and decisions.
A sentencer in a capital case must be allowed to consider the mitigating qualities of youth in the
course of its deliberations over the appropriate sentence.").
143. See Roper, 543 U.S. 551 (holding that the Eighth Amendment requires banning imposition of
the death penalty for offenders under eighteen years old).
144. Id. at 555 (explaining Christopher Simmons was seventeen years old when he committed
murder); see also supra notes 137-141 and accompanying text (discussing Gall's age as a factor in
his sentencing).
145. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 636 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[l]nterior decorating
is a rock-hard science compared to psychology practiced by amateurs. A few citations of '[research
in psychology' that have no particular bearing upon the precise issue here, cannot disguise the fact
that the Court has gone beyond the realm where judges know what they are doing.").
146. Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 602 ("The Court of Appeals clearly disagreed with the District Judge's
conclusion that consideration of the [factors under § 3553(a)] justified a sentence of probation; it
believed that the circumstances presented here were insufficient to sustain such a marked deviation
from the Guidelines range. But it is not for the Court of Appeals to decide de novo whether the
justification for a variance is sufficient or the sentence reasonable. On abuse-of-discretion review,
the Court of Appeals should have given due deference to the District Court's reasoned and
reasonable decision that the [factors under § 3553(a)], on the whole, justified the sentence.").
147. Id.
b. Justices Scalia and Souter Concur 48
Justice Scalia's concurrence is brief and offered simply to recognize
that, although he is still concerned with the Sixth Amendment implications
from Booker,149  the majority's opinion will likely result in fewer
constitutional challenges. 50  Justice Scalia has always had difficulty
accepting the premise that judge-found facts should be relied upon in
sentencing a defendant under the Guidelines."'5 However, he seems to have
relaxed his stance a bit since Booker.
It is curious how Justice Scalia points out his belief of the inherent flaw
in a substantive reasonableness review of sentences, then opts to give stare
decisis to Rita anyway."5 2 Why not just argue for rejecting a substantive
review all together and replacing it with some other mechanism of review?
He partially addresses that question in ending his short concurrence,
reassured that at least defendants can still challenge sentences upheld based
on facts not admitted to or proven to a jury on an as-applied basis.'53
Justice Souter's concurring opinion is even briefer than that of Justice
Scalia. 15 4  Justice Souter continues to advocate a return to a system of
mandatory guidelines with the caveat requirement of jury trials necessary to
prove facts used in sentencing increases for defendants under the
Guidelines.'55 This would likely suit Justice Scalia just fine. 156
148. See id. at 602-03 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 603 (Souter, J., concurring).
149. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
150. Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 602 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("The highly deferential standard adopted by
the Court today will result in far fewer unconstitutional sentences than the proportionality standard
employed by the Eighth Circuit.").
151. See Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2478 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("[M]y
position is that there will inevitably be some constitutional violations under a system of substantive
reasonableness review, because there will be some sentences that will be upheld as reasonable only
because of the existence ofjudge-found facts.").
152. Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 602 (Scalia, J., concurring).
153. Id. at 602-03 (citing Rita, 127 S. Ct. 2456).
154. Id. at 603 (Souter, J., concurring).
155. Id. ("My disagreements with [the] holdings in [Booker and Rita] are not the stuff of formallyperpetual dissent, but I see their objectionable points hexing our judgments today." (citing Rita, 127
S. Ct. 2456 (Souter, J., dissenting); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 272 (2005) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting in part)).
156. See Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2475 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("I disagreed with the Court's remedial
choice [in Booker], believing instead that the proper remedy was to maintain the mandatory
character of the Guidelines and simply to require, for that small category of cases in which a fact
was legally essential to the sentence imposed, that the fact be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable
doubt or admitted by the defendant." (citing Booker, 543 U.S. at 272-91 (Stevens, J., joined by
Scalia & Souter, JJ., dissenting in part))).
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c. Justices Thomas and Alito Dissent'
5 7
Justice Thomas, refusing to accept the Guidelines as "advisory" under
Booker, offers the following one-sentence dissent in Gall: "Consistent with
my dissenting opinion in Kimbrough v. United States, I would affirm the
judgment of the Court of Appeals because the District Court committed
statutory error when it departed below the applicable Guidelines range."
58
Justice Thomas's dissent in Kimbrough stands for the proposition that
application of the Guidelines as "advisory" instead of "mandatory" is simply
unworkable.159  Further, § 3553(b) should still be applied as written,
160
making the Guidelines mandatory and any departure from the Guidelines
judicial error.161  Essentially, the district court's departure from the
Guidelines is only "statutory error" as viewed by Justice Thomas, who now
completely ignores the fact that Booker is the law of the land (at least for
now). 162
In contrast to Justice Thomas, 163 Justice Alito recognizes Booker as
rendering the Guidelines "advisory."' 64 In his Kimbrough dissent, Justice
Alito elects to discard strict constructionism for a historical analysis of the
Sixth Amendment and sentencing jurisprudence, ultimately concluding that
the district court failed to give adequate weight to the policy considerations
157. Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 603 (Thomas, J., dissenting); id. at 603-10 (Alito, J., dissenting).
158. Id. at 603 (citation omitted).
159. Id.; see also Kimbrough v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 558, 578 (2007) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting); infra Part lII.B.2.c (analyzing Justice Thomas's dissent in Kimbrough).
160. See supra note 59 (discussing Booker's conversion of Guidelines from "mandatory" to
"advisory" by excising § 3553(b)(1)); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (2006) ("In determining
whether a circumstance was adequately taken into consideration, the court shall consider only the
sentencing guidelines, policy statements, and official commentary of the Sentencing Commission."
(emphasis added)), held unconstitutional by Booker, 543 U.S. 220.
161. Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 603 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. at 578
(Thomas, J., dissenting); infra Part IllI.B.2.c (analyzing Justice Thomas's dissent in Kimbrough).
162. Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. at 578 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("Although I joined Justice Scalia's
dissent in Rita accepting the Booker remedial opinion as a matter of 'statutory stare decisis,' I am
now convinced that there is no principled way to apply the Booker remedy-certainly not one based
on the statute. Accordingly, I think it best to apply the statute as written, including 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(b), which makes the Guidelines mandatory." (citation omitted) (quoting Rita v. United
States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2457 (2007))).
163. See supra text accompanying note 158 (quoting Justice Thomas's one-sentence dissent in
Gall).
164. Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 603 (Alito, J., dissenting). For Justice Alito, "[t]he fundamental question
in (Gall] is whether, under the remedial decision in [Booker], a district court must give the policy
decisions that are embodied in the Sentencing Guidelines at least some significant weight in making
a sentencing decision. [He] answerfs] that question in the affirmative ...." Id. (citation omitted).
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under the Guidelines. 165 His dissent is broken down into two parts: the first
discussing his interpretation of the law 166 and the second applying that
interpretation to the facts of Gall. 167
Justice Alito's dissent begins by defining what it means for the
Guidelines to be advisory: "District courts must not only 'consult' the
Guidelines, they must 'take them into account."",168 But isn't that exactly
what the district court did here? 169 Or does the end define the means? After
emphasizing the need to avoid sentencing disparities,1 70 Justice Alito moves
on to a speculative portrayal of the chaos awaiting federal courts because, in
his estimation, "sentencing judges [now] need only give lip service to the
Guidelines."' 17
1
165. Strict constructionism is defined as "Itihe doctrinal view ofjudicial construction holding thatjudges should interpret a document or statute (esp. one involving penal sanctions) according to its
literal terms, without looking to other sources to ascertain the meaning." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1462 (8th ed. 2004).
166. Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 603-06 (Alito, J., dissenting).
167. Id. at606-10.
168. Id. at 604 (quoting United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 264 (2005)). Justice Alito spends
the first few paragraphs of his dissent outlining two possible interpretations of what the court meantin Booker by "advisory guidelines" and a "reasonableness review." Id. at 603-05; see supra note
109 (discussing the issue of how clear the Court was in prescribing an abuse-of-discretion standardin Booker). In Justice Alito's estimation, there are two possible interpretations. The firstinterpretation is that the sentencing judge is now only required to give "the Guidelines a polite nod,(and] then proceed essentially as if the Sentencing Reform Act had never been enacted." Id. at 603,He considers this the Stevens-Scalia interpretation. Id. at 603-04 ("This is how two of the dissentsinterpreted (Booker]. Justice Stevens wrote that sentencing judges had 'regained] the unconstraineddiscretion Congress eliminated in 1984' when it enacted the Sentencing Reform Act. Justice Scalia
stated that 'logic compels the conclusion that the sentencing judge.., has full discretion, as full as
what he possessed before the Act was passed, to sentence anywhere within the statutory range."'(citations omitted) (quoting Booker, 543 U.S. at 297 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 305 (Scalia, J.,dissenting in part))). Justice Alito chooses the other possible interpretation, "that sentencing judges
must still give the Guidelines' policy decisions some significant weight and that the courts of
appeals must still police compliance." Id. at 604.
169. The distinction between "consulting" the Guidelines, "taking [the Guidelines] into account,"
and "giving significant weight" to the Guidelines policy decisions is amorphous at best. The fact
that there is no clear definition or consensus as to the meaning of "taking [the Guidelines] into
account" results in difficulty with the consistent application of Booker. Is a district court judge only
required to ensure that the record reflect that she "gave significant weight to Guidelines while takingthem into account" prior to departing from the Guidelines range? See supra note 168 and
accompanying text.
170. Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 604 (Alito, J., dissenting). Justice Alito reminds the majority that a "major
theme" in Booker and Rita is that the Court should continue to promote the 1984 Act's "goal of
reducing sentencing disparities." Id. (citing Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456 (2007); Booker,
543 U.S. at 259--60).
171. Id. at 604-05. Other than a highly educated guess, Justice Alito offers little support for hisprediction that "sentencing disparities will gradually increase.. . and the sentencing habitsdeveloped during the pre-Booker era will fade." Id. The pre-Booker versus post-Booker Guidelinesdeparture statistics do, however, suggest a judicial tendency to vary from the Guidelines when
afforded the flexibility to do so. See Appendix, infra (displaying Guidelines departure statistics from
2001 to 2006).
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After a brief mention of the importance of avoiding disparate
sentences,1 2 Justice Alito shifts to an inquiry into the Sixth Amendment
component of sentencing under the Guidelines.7 3  Considering it was not
raised by the majority, and because there was no real dispute over any fact
considered during Gall's sentencing that might invoke a Sixth Amendment
argument, this case is an unlikely forum for a Sixth Amendment analysis. 
174
No matter, for Justice Alito offers a thoughtful "original intent"' 75 inquiry of
the Sixth Amendment in the context of the Blakely-Booker line of cases. '
76
Back on point, Justice Alito summarizes the central theme of the "issue"
in this case as a determination of how much policy making authority was
given back to the district courts under Booker. 177  The first part of Justice
172. Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 604 (Alito, J., dissenting) ("It is unrealistic to think [the goal of reducing
sentencing disparities] can be achieved over the long term if sentencing judges need only give lip
service to the Guidelines."). Justice Alito actually places a great deal of importance on avoiding
sentencing disparities as a factor "slighted" by the district court. Id. at 607. He mentions it several
times over the course of his dissent. Id. at 607-10. However, it seems that if Congress feels
avoiding disparate sentences is of central importance and not to be trusted to the discretion of the
federal judiciary, Congress could simply enact mandatory sentences for each offense.
173. Id. at 605.
174. Even Justice Alito admits that the Sixth Amendment has little to do with this particular case
as presented. See id. at 604 ("[T]he rules set out in the Court's opinion in the present case have
nothing to do with juries or factfinding and, indeed, that not one of the facts that bears on petitioner's
sentence is disputed. What is at issue, instead, is the allocation of the authority to decide issues of
substantive sentencing policy, an issue on which the Sixth Amendment says absolutely nothing. The
yawning gap between the Sixth Amendment and the Court's opinion should be enough to show that
the Blakely-Booker line of cases has gone astray.").
175. Original intent is defined as "[t]he mental state of the drafters or enactors of the U.S.
Constitution, a statute, or another document." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 826 (8th ed. 2004).
176. Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 605-06 & nn.1-2 (Alito, J., dissenting). Justice Alito raises the interesting
criticism of the Court's distinction in Blakely between "judicial factfinding under a guidelines
system and judicial factfinding under a discretionary sentencing system." Id. at 605 (citing Blakely
v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 309-10 (2004)). He takes a strong originalist interpretation of the
Sixth Amendment, citing several colonial sentencing statutes from the 18th century to make his
point that judge-found facts have always been considered in raising sentences within a sentencing
range. Id. ("It would be a coherent principle to hold that any fact that increases a defendant's
sentence beyond the minimum required by the jury's verdict of guilt must be found by a jury. Such
a holding, however, would clash with accepted sentencing practice at the time of the adoption of the
Sixth Amendment."). That raises the question as to whether the sentencing practices of the
individual States at the time the Sixth Amendment was enacted necessarily endorse the idea of
increasing sentences based on judge-found facts, or do they indicate an intent on the part of the
drafters to curb the practice of courts in increasing sentences based on facts that have not been
admitted to or proven to a jury? Cf Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 35 (1991) (Scalia,
J., concurring) ("[Gideon v. Wainwright] established that no matter how strong its historical
pedigree, a procedure prohibited by the Sixth Amendment... violates 'fundamental fairness' and
must be abandoned by the States.").
177. Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 606 (Alito, J., dissenting).
Aiito's dissent ends with his adoption of a Booker interpretation "requir[ing]
sentencing judges to give weight to the Guidelines" in order to "minimize
the gap between what the Sixth Amendment requires and what [the Court's]
cases have held."
' 178
The second part of Justice Alito's dissent in Gall is broken down into
two sections: Section A, which focuses on the treatment of Gall by the
Eighth Circuit and the district court;179 and Section B, which critiques the
majority's holding. 180  Section A opens with the pronouncement that the
Eighth Circuit was correct in its assessment of the district court's abuse of
discretion for failing to "give sufficient weight to the policy decisions
reflected in the Guidelines."' 8'1 Justice Alito lists the factors he feels were
"slighted" to the exclusion of the others. 182 He also offers a litany of cases
to shore up support for the main theme of his dissent, that the district court
178. Id. ("I recognize that the Court is committed to the Blakely-Booker line of cases, but we are
not required to continue along a path that will take us further and further off course.").
179. Id. at 606-09.
180. Id.at609-10.
181. Again, this is a common theme in Justice Alito's dissent. See supra note 172 (discussing
Justice Alito's view of the importance of avoiding sentencing disparities). Although he continuously
stresses the district court's under-appreciation of at least three separate factors, he opens this section
by outlining facts about the seriousness of Gall's crime and stating the extent of the district court's
departure from the Guidelines. The tone suggests that Justice Alito, perhaps rightfully, just feels the
sentence does not fit the crime, notwithstanding any mitigating factors present. Gall, 128 S. Ct. at
606-07 (Alito, J., dissenting) ("Petitioner was convicted of a serious crime, conspiracy to distribute
'ecstasy.' He distributed thousands of pills and made between $30,000 and $40,000 in
profit.... The Sentencing Guidelines called for a term of imprisonment of 30 to 37 months, but the
District Court imposed a term of probation."). Justice Alito also points out that the motivation for
Gall's "voluntary" withdrawal from the conspiracy was fear of apprehension. See supra note 88(discussing different perspectives of Gall's "voluntary" withdrawal from the conspiracy).
182. First, Justice Alito clearly concedes that at least one factor was satisfied. See Gall, 128 S. Ct.
at 607 (Alito, J., dissenting) ("If the question before us was whether a reasonable jurist could
conclude that a sentence of probation was sufficient in this case to serve the purposes of punishment
set out in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2), the District Court's decision could not be disturbed. But because I
believe that sentencing judges must still give some significant weight to the Guidelines sentencing
range, the Commission's policy statements, and the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing
disparities, I agree with the Eighth Circuit that the District Court did not properly exercise its
discretion." (citation omitted) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(3)-(5) (2006)). Section 3553(a)(2) states
that
[t]he court shall impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to... reflect
the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just
punishment for the offense; to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; to protect
the public from further crimes of the defendant; and to provide the defendant with needed
educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the
most effective manner ....
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). Also not mentioned by Justice Alito is § 3553(a)(1) ("the nature and
circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant .... "). The district
court likely considered the factors that Justice Alito ignored to be more compelling than those he
relied upon.
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abused its discretion in sentencing Gall because it "ignored or slighted
[factors] that Congress has deemed pertinent."' 83
Continuing with a discussion of the sentencing factors, Justice Alito
criticizes the district court's consideration of Gall's age and ties with family
and friends,' 84 his lack of criminal history,'85 his behavior while out on
183. Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 607 (Alito, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326,
336 (1988)). None of the cases dealt with application of § 3553(a). Justice Alito relies on Taylor,
citing it thrice to support his position in Gall that the Eighth Circuit aptly conducted an abuse-of-
discretion review and correctly found the district court "slighted" factors under § 3553(a). Id. ("A
decision calling for the exercise of judicial discretion 'hardly means that it is unfettered by
meaningful standards or shielded from thorough appellate review."' (quoting Taylor, 487 U.S. at
336)); id. ("And when a trial court is required by statute to take specified factors into account in
making a discretionary decision, the trial court must be reversed if it 'ignored or slighted a factor that
Congress has deemed pertinent."' (quoting Taylor, 487 U.S. at 337)); id. at 609 ("[lit is entirely
proper for a reviewing court to find an abuse of discretion when important factors-in this case, the
Guidelines, policy statements, and the need to avoid sentencing disparities-are 'slighted."' (quoting
Taylor, 487 U.S. at 337)). Compare Taylor, 487 U.S. at 337 ("[W]hen the statutory factors are
properly considered, and supporting factual findings are not clearly in error, the district court's
judgment of how opposing considerations balance should not lightly be disturbed."), with U.S. v.
Gall, 446 F.3d 884, 889-90 (8th Cir. 2006) ("First, the district court gave too much weight to Gall's
withdrawal from the conspiracy . ... Second, the district court gave significant weight to an
improper factor when it relied on general studies showing persons under the age of 18 display a lack
of maturity, which often results in impetuous and ill-considered actions. ... Third, the district court
did not properly weigh the seriousness of Gall's offense.... Finally, the district court placed too
much emphasis on Gall's post-offense rehabilitation." (emphasis added)). See supra note 100
(quoting the Gall Court's enumerated list of errors made by the Eighth Circuit). Moreover, the
circumstances in Taylor are quite distinguishable from those in Gall. The Court in Taylor found the
trial court abused its discretion after dismissing with prejudice the prosecution of a defendant
charged with conspiracy to distribute cocaine and possession of 400 grams of cocaine with intent to
distribute because of the government's noncompliance with the Speedy Trial Act. See Taylor, 487
U.S. at 343 ("[lit is evident from the record before us that the District Court abused its discretion in
this case. The court did not explain how it factored in the seriousness of the offenses with which
respondent stood charged. The District Court relied heavily on its unexplained characterization of
the Government conduct as 'lackadaisical,' while failing to consider other relevant facts and
circumstances leading to dismissal. Seemingly ignored were the brevity of the delay and the
consequential lack of prejudice to respondent, as well as respondent's own illicit contribution to the
delay. At bottom, the District Court appears to have decided to dismiss with prejudice in this case
in order to send a strong message to the Government that unexcused delays will not be tolerated.
That factor alone, by definition implicated in almost every Speedy Trial Act case, does not suffice to
justify barring reprosecution in light of all the other circumstances present.").
184. Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 608 (Alito, J., dissenting) (characterizing the majority's consideration of
Gall's age and the support of his family and friends as "a direct rejection of the Sentencing
Commission's authority to decide the most basic issues of sentencing policy"); see supra notes 138-
141 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's misplaced reliance on Gall's age as a factor in
departure from the Guidelines); see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5HI.6 (2007)
("[Fiamily ties and responsibilities are not ordinarily relevant in determining whether a departure
may be warranted.").
185. Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 608 (Alito, J., dissenting). Justice Alito points out that Gall's lack of
criminal history was a central factor considered in establishing his sentencing range under the
787
bond, 186 and his voluntary withdrawal from the conspiracy. 187  Justice
Alito's closing sentence in Section A states his disapproval with Gall's
lenient sentence of probation. 8
In Section B of the second part of his dissent, Justice Alito responds to
the majority holding, focusing on two main issues. 189 First, he disapproves
of the majority's "mischaracterization" of the appellate court's
proportionality approach to reviewing Guidelines departures. 190 Second, and
lastly, he condemns the majority's determination that the Eighth Circuit
misapplied the abuse-of-discretion review in Gall.'9'
B. Kimbrough v. United States192
The rule espoused in Gall, that sentencing courts are effectively free to
depart from the Guidelines unrestricted by any tangible measure or standard,
Guidelines. "Consequently, giving petitioner additional credit for this factor was nothing more than
an expression of [the district court's] disagreement with the policy determination reflected in the
Guidelines range." Id. at 608-09.
186. Id. at 609 ("The District Court mentioned petitioner's 'exemplary behavior while on bond,'
but this surely cannot be regarded as a weighty factor." (citation omitted)).
187. Id.; see supra note 88 (contrasting the differing perspectives of Gall's "voluntary"
withdrawal from the conspiracy).
188. Id. (arguing that while the district court's positive consideration of Gall's withdrawal from
the conspiracy and self-rehabilitation was appropriate, those factors are not sufficient to justify
Gall's sentence of probation in lieu of the recommended prison term of thirty to thirty-seven months
under the Guidelines).
189. Id. at609-10.
190. Id. at 609. Justice Alito correctly notes that the majority overstates the appellate court's use
of strict mathematical formulas in determining what constitutes a reasonable degree of departure
from the Guidelines based on individual factors and circumstances. He accuses the majority of
attacking "straw men." See supra note 120 (discussing the use of a "straw man" argument). He then
defends the approach taken by the Seventh and Eighth Circuits in applying a proportionality
approach in reviewing the degree of divergence from the Guidelines. See Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 609
(Alito, J., dissenting) ("This criticism is quite unfair. It is apparent that the Seventh and Eighth
Circuits did not mean to suggest that proportionality review could be reduced to a mathematical
equation, and certainly the Eighth Circuit in this case did not assign numbers to the various
justifications offered by the District Court." (citing United States v. Claiborne, 439 F.3d 479 (8th
Cir. 2006); United States v. Johnson, 427 F.3d 423 (7th Cir. 2005))).
191. Justice Alito calls attention to the fact that the "Eighth Circuit stated unequivocally that it
was conducting abuse-of-discretion review .... Id. (citing United States v. Gall, 446 F.3d 884,
888-89 (8th Cir. 2006)). This line of argument seems to imply that so long as the appellate court
labels its review as "abuse-of-discretion," it must presumptively be what it purports to be.
According to the majority, that is the problem with the Eighth Circuit's review in this case. See
Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 600 ("Although the [Eighth Circuit] correctly stated that the appropriate standard
of review was abuse of discretion, it engaged in an analysis that more closely resembled de novo
review .. "). Justice Alito again cites Taylor for the proposition that important sentencing factors
were "slighted" by the district court. See supra note 183 (discussing Justice Alito's citation of
United States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326 (1988)).
192. 128 S. Ct. 558 (2007).
[Vol. 36: 757, 2009] Judicial Discretion and Sentencing Guidelines
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
sets the stage for Kimbrough.193  Here, the Court is asked to determine
whether a district court should have the discretion to consider its own
disagreement with the 100-to-1 crack/powder cocaine ratio as a factor in
departing from the Guidelines ranges. 194
1. Facts of Kimbrough 95
In 2004, Derrick Kimbrough was indicted in district court on four
separate criminal offenses. 196  He pled guilty to all of the charges:
"conspiracy to distribute crack and powder cocaine; possession with intent
to distribute more than 50 grams of crack cocaine; possession with intent to
distribute powder cocaine; and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a
drug trafficking offense."'1 97 After factoring in Kimbrough's false testimony
in a codefendant's trial, 198 the district court found Kimbrough's offense level
to be a 34.'99 Under the applicable Guidelines, Kimbrough's sentencing
exposure was 168 to 210 months in prison on the three drug charges and an
additional 60 months for the firearm charge, raising his final Guidelines
range to 228 to 270 months (19 to 22.5 years).200
The district court held that such a lengthy sentence "would have been
'greater than necessary' to accomplish the purposes of sentencing set forth in
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). '' 20 1 Perhaps what made this case such a lightning rod
was the district judge's general criticism of the disparate sentences for crack
cocaine under the Guidelines.20 2 In what would later seemingly be the burr
193. In order to take the focus off of the clear leniency given to Brian Gall in light of his
individual facts, the Court cloaks its decision in reliance of the deferential abuse-of-discretion
review. See Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 602.
194. See infra note 206 and accompanying text (quoting the Fourth Circuit's rigid rule barring
consideration of the crack/powder disparity in sentencing).
195. Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. 558, 564-66.
196. Id. at 564. Kimbrough was indicted in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia. Id.
197. Id. at 565 (discussing the district court's diligence in taking "into account the 'nature and
circumstances' of the offense and Kimbrough's 'history and characteristics."').
198. Some say, "No good deed goes unpunished."
199. Id. The base offense level for Kimbrough's three drug charges was 32. His false testimony
increased the level to 34. Id. Additionally, the probation presentence report established
Kimbrough's criminal history at Category II. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. ("The (district] court also commented that the case exemplified the 'disproportionate and
unjust effect that crack cocaine guidelines have in sentencing."').
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under the Fourth Circuit's saddle,2 °3  the district court "contrasted
Kimbrough's Guidelines range of 228 to 270 months with the range that
would have applied had he been accountable for an equivalent amount of
powder cocaine: 97 to 106 months, inclusive of the 5-year mandatory
minimum for the firearm charge. ' 2°  In light of all factors considered, the
district court sentenced Kimbrough to 180 months in prison with five
additional years of supervised release. 20 5  The sentence was forty-eight
months below the Guidelines range.
The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court, holding that a sentence
"outside the guidelines range is per se unreasonable when it is based on a
disagreement with the sentencing disparity for crack and powder cocaine
offenses. 2 °6 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in order to
quell the confusion as to whether the disparate cocaine Guidelines are
"advisory" under Booker. 207
2. Analysis and Critique of Kimbrough
a. Justice Ginsburg's Majority Opinion20 8
In another 7-2 decision,20 9 the Supreme Court held that the Fourth
Circuit erred in holding the district court must consider the disparity
between crack and powder cocaine effectively mandatory under the
Guidelines.2 10 In other words, while a sentencing court must consider all of
the Guidelines factors, it has the discretion to sentence outside the
Guidelines range if it finds the powder/crack disparity results in a sentencing




206. United States v. Kimbrough, 174 F.App'x 798 (4th Cir. 2006) (citing United States v. Eura,
440 F.3d 625, 633-34 (4th Cir. 2006)), rev'd, 128 S. Ct. 558 (2007).
207. Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. at 565-66 & n.4 (discussing several post-Booker appellate cases that
conflicted with each other as to whether a district court could consider the crack/powder disparity in
departing from the Guidelines). Several of these cases, which all held the disparity could not be
considered as a factor, are ultimately abrogated by the holding in Kimbrough. See United States v.
Leatch, 482 F.3d 790 (5th Cir. 2007); United States v. Johnson, 474 F.3d 515 (8th Cir. 2007); United
States v. Castillo, 460 F.3d 337 (2nd Cir. 2006); United States v. Williams, 456 F.3d 1353 (11 th Cir.
2006); United States v. Miller, 450 F.3d 270 (7th Cir. 2006); United States v. Eura, 440 F.3d 625
(4th Cir. 2006); United States v. Pho, 433 F.3d 53 (1st Cir. 2006)).
208. Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. at 564-76.
209. Id. at 558. Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Chief Justice
Roberts and Justices Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, and Breyer. Id. Justice Scalia filed a
concurring opinion. Id. Justices Thomas and Alito wrote separate dissenting opinions. Id.
210. Id. at 576, rev'g 174 F.App'x 798.
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range "greater than necessary" to satisfy the objectives under the
Guidelines.2 11
After laying out the facts in Kimbrough,212 Justice Ginsburg provides
some history and background information relating to the disparate treatment
of crack and powder cocaine in sentencing.213 She explains the differences
in composition and use of powder versus crack cocaine, 214 then moves on to
the origination of the crack/powder sentencing disparity.215 In enacting the
1986 Act, 1 6 Congress created a two-tiered sentencing scheme intended to
punish higher level manufacturers more severely than lower level
traffickers.217 Concerned over the perceived disproportionate impact crack
was having on crime and society, Congress adopted the now notorious 100-
to-I ratio for sentencing of cocaine related offenses.
2 11
Justice Ginsburg explains the ratio was created intentionally based on
"assumptions" about crack, 219 but the Commission "later determined that the
211. Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. at 564 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (2006)).
212. See supra Part III.B.1 (discussing and analyzing facts in Kimbrough).
213. Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. at 566-69.
214. Id. at 566 (citing 1995 REPORT, supra note 19, at 5, 12). For the purposes of this article, it
suffices to know that crack cocaine is simply made from boiling down cocaine hydrochloride, also
known as powder cocaine, with baking soda and water, thus creating a solid that is broken into small
rocks for smoking. Id. Powder cocaine is most commonly inhaled but is sometimes dissolved in
water and injected via syringe. Id. While the different delivery methods ultimately produce the
same effect, smoking crack is more efficient, producing a more intense high. Id. at 566 & n.5.
215. Id. at 566.
216. 1986 Act, supra note 22.
217. Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. at 566-67 ("The 1986 Act created a two-tiered scheme of five- and
ten-year mandatory minimum sentences for drug manufacturing and distribution offenses [based on
the weight of the drugs involved in the crime]. Congress sought 'to link the ten-year mandatory
minimum trafficking prison term to major drug dealers and to link the five-year minimum term to
serious traffickers."'). As it relates to cocaine, this culminated in a 100-to-1 ratio. In other words,
the Guidelines ranges are the same for offenses involving 5 grams of crack or 500 grams of powder
cocaine. Id. at 567 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(l)(B)(ii)-(iii) (2000)); see U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1(c) (2007). As an interesting historical fact, Justice Ginsburg explains
that when the 1986 Act was being passed, the Commission was contemplating a sentencing scheme
for drugs that was based on empirical evidence, including 10,000 presentence reports. Kimbrough,
128 S. Ct. at 567. However, this approach was abandoned and the weight-driven scheme was
adopted. Id.
218. See infra note 219 (quoting the 1995 Report's characterization of crack as "a matter of great
public concern").
219. Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. at 567. It is clear that the majority is making its case for the
unreasonableness of the crack/powder disparity, but it is not clear that the argument is intellectually
honest. When describing the enactment of the provision, the majority implies Congress overreacted:
Crack cocaine was a relatively new drug when the 1986 Act was signed into law, but it
was already a matter of great public concern: "Drug abuse in general, and crack cocaine
in particular, had become in public opinion and in members' minds a problem of
crack/powder sentencing disparity is generally unwarranted."22 This leads
to a rather detailed discussion of conclusions made by the Commission over
the years in this arena, including the following observation:
[T]he crack/powder sentencing differential "fosters disrespect for
and lack of confidence in the criminal justice system" because of a
"widely-held perception" that it "promotes unwarranted disparity
based on race." Approximately 85 percent of defendants convicted
of crack offenses in federal court are black; thus the severe
sentences required by the 100-to-i ratio are imposed "primarily
upon black offenders." '22 1
Justice Ginsburg makes the point that the Commission has on several
occasions sought to reduce the sentencing ratio between powder cocaine and
crack. 222 The most recent legal development in this area is an amendment to
the Guidelines that reduces the base level under the Guidelines for crack
offenses by two levels.223
overwhelming dimensions." Congress apparently believed that crack was significantly
more dangerous than powder cocaine in that: (1) crack was highly addictive; (2) crack
users and dealers were more likely to be violent than users and dealers of other
drugs .... Based on these assumptions, the 1986 Act adopted a "100-to-I ratio" that
treated every gram of crack cocaine as the equivalent of 100 grams of powder cocaine.
Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Compare the characterization of those factors as
"assumptions" to the following, from later in the majority opinion: "[T]he Commission's most
recent reports do not urge identical treatment of crack and powder cocaine ... because crack is more
addictive than powder, crack offenses are more likely to involve weapons or bodily injury, and crack
distribution is associated with higher levels of crime .... Id. at 568 (emphasis added) (quoting
1995 REPORT, supra note 19).
220. Id. The Commission found that there were assumptions about crack that have largely not
come to fruition, including the assumptions that prenatal crack exposure was more harmful than
exposure to powder cocaine and that crack use would produce an epidemic of young crack users. Id.
(citing 2007 REPORT, supra note 31, at 8). The Commission also realized that "[d]rug importers and
major traffickers generally deal in powder cocaine, which is then converted into crack by street-level
sellers." See 1995 REPORT, supra note 19, at 66-67. "But the 100-to-I ratio can lead to the
'anomalous' result that 'retail crack dealers get longer sentences than the wholesale drug distributors
who supply them the powder cocaine from which their crack is produced."' Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct.
at 568 (quoting 1995 REPORT, supra note 19, at 174).
221. Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. at 568 (quoting U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, REPORT TO CONGRESS:
COCAINE AND FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY, at iv (2002), available at http://www.ussc.gov/r-
congress/02crack/2002crackrpt.pdf [hereinafter 2002 REPORT]).
222. Id. at 568-69. Congress rejected the Commission's attempt to amend the crack/powder ratio
to 1-to-I in 1995, but directed the Commission to submit a proposal for a revised ratio. Id. at 569
(citing 1995 REPORT, supra note 19). In 1997, the Commission proposed a 5-to-I ratio. Id. (citing
U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SPECIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FEDERAL SENTENCING
POLICY 2 (1997), available at http://www.ussc.gov/rcongress/newcrack.pdf). In 2002, the
Commission proposed dropping the ratio to at least 20-to-I. Id. (citing 2002 Report, supra note 221,
at viii). Congress adopted neither proposal. Id.
223. Id. at 569 & nn.l 1-12 (citing Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines for United States
Courts, 72 Fed. Reg. 28571-72 (May 21, 2007) [hereinafter 2007 Amendments]). Under 28 U.S.C.
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Having laid the historical foundation for Kimbrough, the majority makes
the threshold acknowledgement that under Booker2 24 the Guidelines are
advisory and review of Guidelines departures is an abuse-of-discretion
standard.2 5 Justice Ginsburg explains the Government's position that the
100-to-I sentencing ratio for crack/powder cocaine is "an exception to the
'general freedom that sentencing courts have to apply the [§ 3553(a)]
factors."'' 226 This is "because the ratio is a 'specific policy determinatio[n]
that Congress has directed sentencing courts to observe.' '2 27  The
Government levied three main arguments in support of this position, and the
majority addresses all three in detail.22 8
First, the majority rejects the Government's supposition that the 1986
Act implicitly requires adherence of courts and the Commission to the 100-
to-1 ratio. 229  The argument is grounded in the assumption that because
Congress set statutory minimum sentences for certain drug offenses based
on quantity ratios, the Commission must set its sentencing standards based
§ 994(p), the Commission promulgated amendments to the Guidelines in May 2007 that became
effective on November 1, 2007. Congress could have rejected the amendments at any time prior to
November 2007. So the amendment to the crack/powder sentencing was effected by Congressional
inaction, which seems to indicate its tacit approval of the change. However, this was a minor
change, and even with the amendment in place, Kimbrough's sentence given by the district court
would still be fifteen months below the amended Guidelines range. Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. at 569
n.1l.
224. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
225. Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. at 569-70; see supra note 109 (discussing of the abuse-of-discretion
standard for appellate review of sentences). Justice Ginsburg agrees with the broad concession
offered by the Government "that the Guidelines 'are now advisory' and that, as a general matter,
'courts may vary [from Guidelines ranges] based solely on policy considerations, including
disagreements with the Guidelines."' Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. at 570 (quoting Brief for United States
at 16, Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. 558 (No. 06-6330), 2007 WL 2461473). The Government's expansive
reading of Booker and Rita offers little friction for the majority's opinion in Kimbrough. Cf Rita v.
United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2465 (2007) (holding a district court may consider arguments that
"the Guidelines sentence itself fails properly to reflect § 3553(a) considerations"). Perhaps in this
sense, the Government had a clearer understanding of Booker than did the Eighth and Fourth
Circuits.
226. See supra note 122 (listing all of the factors under § 3553(a)).
227. Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. at 570 (citing Brief for the United States, supra note 225, at 16).
228. Id. at 570-74. The majority's answers to the three arguments offered by the Government are
in Sections A, B and C of Part III of the majority opinion.
229. Id. at 570-71 ("The Government acknowledges that the 'Congress did not expressly direct
the Sentencing Commission to incorporate the 100:1 ratio in the Guidelines.' Nevertheless, it asserts
that the Act '[i]mplicit[ly]' requires the Commission and sentencing courts to apply the 100-to-i
ratio. Any deviation, the Government urges, would be 'logically incoherent' when combined with
mandatory minimum sentences based on the 100-to-I ratio." (citations omitted) (citing Brief for the
United States supra note 225, at 32-33)).
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on those same ratios.230 The Court flatly rejects the Government's statutory
interpretation of an implied Congressional directive to the Commission.23'
Next, the Court addresses the Government's assertion that Congress
signaled its commitment to the 100-to-1 sentencing scheme in its rejection
of the proposed 1-to-I ratio in 1995.232 Further, the Government argues that
Congress's reaction to the 1995 Report included comments concerned with
maintaining the sentencing disparity between crack and powder cocaine. 33
The majority dismisses both claims.234 Justice Ginsburg explains that
Congress's reaction to the 1995 Report never endorsed a ratio of 100-to-1; in
fact, Congress required a revision of the ratio from the Commission. 35
230. Id. This is a difficult argument for someone not familiar with the federal sentencing scheme
to fully comprehend. It is important to remember that the Guidelines are promulgated by the
Commission, independent of the statutory mandatory minimum sentences for certain offenses set by
Congress. The argument the Government was trying to make was that Congress established a 100-
to- I ratio by setting a mandatory minimum sentence of five years for offenses involving 500 grams
of powder cocaine or only 5 grams of crack cocaine. The only logical conclusion, according to the
Govemment, was that the Guidelines maintain the same 100-to-I ratio between powder cocaine and
crack.
231. Id. at 571 ("The [1986 Act], by its terms, mandates only maximum and minimum sentences:
A person convicted of possession with intent to distribute 5 grams or more of crack cocaine must be
sentenced to a minimum of 5 years and the maximum term is 40 years. A person with 50 grams or
more of crack cocaine must be sentenced to a minimum of 10 years and the maximum term is life.
The statute says nothing about the appropriate sentences within these brackets, and we decline to
read any implicit directive into that congressional silence." (citing Jama v. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, 543 U.S. 335, 341 (2005))). The Court goes on to point out that Congress has made it
clear that it knows how to set express terms for sentencing when it wishes to do so. Id. To illustrate
its assertion that there is no obligation for the Guidelines standards to comport with those of the
mandatory minimum statutes, the Court cites Neal v. Unites States, 516 U.S. 284 (1996), which held
that the Commission's revised standard for calculating weight of LSD was not imputed to mandatory
minimum statute. See Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. at 572 ("[O]ur opinion in Neal never questioned the
validity of the altered Guidelines. To the contrary, we stated: 'Entrusted within its sphere to make
policy judgments, the Commission may abandon its old methods in favor of what it has deemed a
more desirable "approach" to calculating LSD quantities.' If the 1986 Act does not require the
Commission to adhere to the Act's method for determining LSD weights, it does not require the
Commission-or, after Booker, sentencing courts-to adhere to the 100-to-I ratio for crack cocaine
quantities other than those that trigger the statutory mandatory minimum sentences." (quoting Neal,
516 U.S. at 295)).
232. Id. at 572. This argument is discussed in Section B of Part Ill of the majority opinion.
233. Id. ("Congress 'not only disapproved of the 1:1 ratio,' the Government urges; it also made
clear 'that the 1986 Act required the Commission (and sentencing courts) to take drug quantities into
account, and to do so in a manner that respects the 100:1 ratio."' (quoting Brief for the United States,
supra note 225, at 35)).
234. Id.
235. Id. The Court agrees with the Government that Congress rejected the I-to-I ratio in 1995,
but notes that while "Congress... expressed the view that 'the sentence imposed for trafficking in a
quantity of crack cocaine should generally exceed the sentence imposed for trafficking in a like
quantity of powder cocaine.' But nothing in Congress'[s] 1995 reaction ... suggested that crack
sentences must exceed powder sentences by a ratio of 100 to 1. To the contrary, Congress's 1995
action required the Commission to recommend a 'revision of the drug quantity ratio of crack cocaine
to powder cocaine."' Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Act of Oct. 30, 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-38,
§ 2(a), 109 Stat. 334 (1995) (codified as amended in 28 U.S.C. § 994 note (2000))).
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Also, it would be paradoxical in light of Congress's adoption of the 2007
amendment to the ratio to read its rejection of the 1-to-i ratio in 1995 to
mean Congress intended to bar any deviation whatsoever from the 100-to-i
ratio. 216
The third argument advanced by the Government is that freedom of
district courts to depart from the Guidelines "based on disagreements with
the crack/powder ratio" would result in two kinds of unwarranted sentencing
237disparities.  The first concern is that "sentencing cliffs" would be created
around drug quantities that set off mandatory minimum sentences.
238  To
illustrate, the Court provides a hypothetical example of a defendant who was
convicted of an offense involving forty-nine grams of crack.
2 39  The
sentencing judge would have the discretion to grant a significant downward
departure based on the advisory guidelines, but another defendant in the
same situation with only one more gram of crack would be subject to the
mandatory minimum sentencing statute, thus potentially creating a
sentencing cliff between the two similarly situated defendants.
240  The
second disparity posited by the Government would be created as the natural
result of varying opinions regarding the crack/powder disparity from one
sentencing judge to the next.241  The Court dismisses both arguments with
the reassurance that "advisory Guidelines combined with appellate review
for reasonableness and ongoing revision of the Guidelines in response to
sentencing practices will help to 'avoid excessive sentencing 
disparities.' 242
236. Id. at 572-73. The Government argued that Congress's requirement of the "Commission to
propose changes to the 100-to-i ratio in both the 1986 Act and the Guidelines... implicitly
foreclosed any deviation from the 100-to-I ratio in the Guidelines (or by sentencing courts) in the
absence of a corresponding change in the statute." Id. (citing Brief for the United States, supra note
225, at 35-36). The 2007 amendment resulted in a crack/powder ratio of between 25-to-i and 80-to-
1, depending on the offense level. Id. at 573 (citing 2007 Amendments, supra note 223). The fact
that Congress allowed the 2007 amendment to take effect conflicts with the Government's analysis
of the 1986 Act and Congress's 1995 action. Id.
237. Id. at 573-74. This argument is discussed in Section C of Part III of the majority opinion.
238. Id. at 573.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id. ("[I]f district courts are permitted to vary from the Guidelines based on their disagreement
with the crack/powder disparity, 'defendants with identical real conduct will receive markedly
different sentences, depending on nothing more than the particular judge drawn for sentencing.'
(quoting Brief for the United States, supra note 225, at 40).
242. Id. at 573-74 (quoting United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 264 (2005)). The Court also
mentions that, to some extent, the mandatory minimums act as control on disparities. To support
this point, the Court quotes a "Sentencing Commission report[] that roughly 70% of crack offenders
are responsible for drug quantities that yield base offense levels at or only two levels above those
that correspond to the statutory minimums." Id. at 574 (citing 2007 REPORT, supra note 220, at 25).
795
After addressing the Government's main arguments, the opinion moves
on to a commentary of the importance of the Commission, particularly in the
wake of Booker, Rita, and Gall.243 The Court makes the observation that the
Commission's role is vital in that it has the capacity to make policy
decisions based on analysis of empirical sentencing data collected on a
national level. 244 However, the sentencing judge is in the superior position
to weigh the appropriate sentencing factors in each case. 245 Accordingly, the
Court declares "it would not be an abuse of discretion for a district court to
conclude when sentencing a particular defendant that the crack/powder
disparity yields a sentence 'greater than necessary' to achieve § 3553(a)'s
purposes, even in a mine-run case. 246
Having provided such a thorough refutation of the Government's
position on Guidelines operation and such a detailed analysis of its own
position, the Court finally arrives at Kimbrough's situation. 247 First, Justice
Ginsburg endorses the sentence imposed, recounting the district court's
consideration of "the nature and circumstances" of Kimbrough's crime 248
and his personal "history and characteristics.,, 249  Next, Justice Ginsburg
recognizes the district court's criticism of the unwarranted disparity that
would result from applying 100-to-i ratio to Kimbrough's sentence and
deems it to be an appropriate consideration. 250  Lastly, the Court weighs in
243. Id. at 574 (citing Booker, 543 U.S. 220; Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456 (2007); Gall v.
United States, 128 S. Ct. 586 (2007)).
244. Id. ("[T]he Commission fills an important institutional role: It has the capacity courts lack to
'base its determinations on empirical data and national experience, guided by a professional staff
with appropriate expertise."' (quoting United States v. Pruitt, 502 F.3d 1154, 1171 (10th Cir. 2007)
(McConnell, J., concurring))).
245. Id. ("The sentencing judge, on the other hand, has 'greater familiarity with.., the individual
case and the individual defendant before him than the Commission or the appeals court.' He is
therefore 'in a superior position to find facts and judge their import under § 3353(a)' in each
particular case." (citations omitted)).
246. Id. at 575 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006)); see supra note 122 (listing all of the factors
under § 3553(a)).
247. Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. at 575.
248. Id. The Court begins its analysis of Kimbrough's sentencing by observing that the district
court first calculated the sentencing range under the Guidelines and then considered the relevant
factors under § 3553. Id. This is exactly the procedure outlined in Gall. See supra notes 121-125
and accompanying text. Justice Ginsburg then characterizes Kimbrough's crime as "unremarkable,"in that "[Kimbrough] and another defendant were caught sitting in a car with some crack cocaine and
powder by two police officers-that's the sum and substance of it-and they also had] a firearm."
Id.
249. Id. (noting that "Kimbrough had no prior felony convictions, that he had served in combatduring Operation Desert Storm and received an honorable discharge from the Marine Corps, and that
he had a steady history of employment").
250. Id. The Court compares Kimbrough's actual sentence as awarded by the district court offifteen years to the sentence he would have gotten under the Guidelines of at least nineteen and ahalf years, concluding the district court "appropriately framed its final determination in line with§ 3553(a)'s overarching instruction to 'impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary'
to accomplish the sentencing goals advanced in § 3553(a)(2)." Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553). The
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on the issue of whether the Guidelines departure was an abuse-of-discretion
on the part of the district court, ultimately holding that in "[g]iving due
respect to the District Court's reasoned appraisal, a reviewing court could
not rationally conclude that the four-and-a-half-year sentence reduction
Kimbrough received qualified as an abuse of discretion., 25 ' As such, the
Supreme Court reverses the Fourth Circuit's judgment and remands the
case.
252
b. Justice Scalia Concurs
253
Rare is the occasion when Justice Scalia will abstain from expressing his
concern for Sixth Amendment violations relating to sentencing under the
Guidelines.254 Here, he offers a short concurrence that quotes several cases
from Booker-to-present in order to illustrate the "advisory" nature of the
Guidelines.255 With that in mind, he expresses his concern that
Court approves of the district court's conclusion that "the crack cocaine guidelines [drove
Kimbrough's] offense level to a point higher than is necessary to do justice in this case." Id. Thus,
under the criteria set forth in Gall, the district court "committed no procedural error." Id. at 575-76
(quoting Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 600 (2007)).
251. Id. at 576 (citing Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 601-02; Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2469-70
(2007)). In justifying its rationale, the majority relies heavily on the sentiments expressed over the
years by the Commission regarding the crack/powder ratio. See id. ("The sentence the District Court
imposed on Kimbrough was 4.5 years below the bottom of the Guidelines range. But in determining
that 15 years was the appropriate prison term, the District Court properly homed in on the particular
circumstances of Kimbrough's case and accorded weight to the Sentencing Commission's consistent
and emphatic position that the crack/powder disparity is at odds with § 3553(a)."). Remarkably, the
majority also comments on the Government's failure to argue that the "downward variance [was]
unsupported by § 3553(a)." Id. However, this seems implied given the central theme of the
Government's argument, that the 100-to-1 sentencing ratio is mandatory. It would weaken the
Government's position to advance the alternative theories that on one hand, the sentence under the
Guidelines is absolutely mandatory, but on the other hand, even if it is not mandatory, a downward
variance pursuant to § 3553(a) is unsupported by the facts in Kimbrough.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 576-77 (Scalia, J., concurring).
254. See, e.g., Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2478 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring); Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 602
(Scalia, J., concurring); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 272-313 (2005) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting in part); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466,498-523 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring).
255. Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. at 576-77 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("[Our remedial opinion] requires a
sentencing court to consider Guidelines ranges, . . . but it permits the court to tailor the sentence in
light of other statutory concerns as well, see § 3553(a) .... [W]ithout this provision-namely the
provision that makes 'the relevant sentencing rules... mandatory and impose[s] binding
requirements on all sentencing judges'-the statute falls outside the scope of requirement .... The
district courts, while not bound to apply the Guidelines, must consult those Guidelines and take them
into account when sentencing." (quoting Booker, 543 U.S. at 245-46, 259, 264)); Cunningham v.
California, 127 S. Ct. 856, 867 (2007) ("Under the system described in Justice Breyer's opinion for
the Court in Booker, judges would no longer be tied to the sentencing range indicated in the
If there is any thumb on the scales; if the Guidelines must be
followed even where the district court's application of the § 3553(a)
factors is entirely reasonable; then the "advisory" Guidelines would,
over a large expanse of their application, entitle the defendant to a
lesser sentence but for the presence of certain additional facts found
by judge rather than jury. This, as we said in Booker, would violate
the Sixth Amendment.256
Justice Scalia seems to be articulating the same concern he voiced in
Gall, that "[w]hether a sentencing scheme uses mandatory Guidelines, a
'proportionality test' for Guidelines variances, or a deferential abuse-of-
discretion standard, there will be some sentences upheld only on the basis of
additional judge-found facts. 257 He is rightfully dismayed by the reality
that under the current sentencing scheme, defendants will still sometimes be
sentenced relying on judge-found facts. Otherwise, § 3553(a), by and large,
serves only as a "one-way [downward] ratchet," generally resulting in lesser
sentences except for those cases in which judicial fact-finding is used for
sentencing increases.258
Guidelines. But they would be obliged to 'take account of' that range along with the sentencing
goals Congress enumerated in the [Sentencing Reform Act] at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)."); Rita, 127 S.
Ct. at 2466 ("A nonbinding appellate presumption that a Guidelines sentence is reasonable does not
require the sentencing judge to impose that sentence. Still less does it forbid the sentencing judge
from imposing a sentence higher than the Guidelines provide for the jury-determined facts standing
alone. As far as the law is concerned, the judge could disregard the Guidelines and apply the same
sentence (higher than the statutory minimum or the bottom of the unenhanced Guidelines range) in
the absence of the special facts (say, gun brandishing) which, in the view of the Sentencing
Commission, would warrant a higher sentence within the statutorily permissible range.").
256. Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. at 577.
257. Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 602 (Scalia, J., concurring).
258. Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2477-78 n.2 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)("[S]ince reasonableness review should not function as a one-way ratchet, we must forswear the
notion that sentences can be too low in light of the need to abandon the concept that sentences can be
too high." (citation omitted) (citing Booker, 543 U.S. at 257-58, 266)); see Booker, 543 U.S. at 257-
58 ("Congress would not have enacted sentencing statutes that make it more difficult to adjust
sentences upward than to adjust them downward. As several United States Senators have written in
an amicus brief, 'the Congress that enacted the 1984 Act did not conceive of-much less establish-
a sentencing guidelines system in which sentencing judges were free to consider facts or
circumstances not found by a jury or admitted in a plea agreement for the purpose of adjusting a
base-offense level down, but not up, within the applicable guidelines range. Such a one-way lever
would be grossly at odds with Congress's intent."' (quoting Brief for Senator Orrin G. Hatch et al. as
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 22, Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (Nos. 04-104, 04-105), 2004 WL
1950640)).
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c. Justices Thomas and Alito Dissent
25 9
Justice Thomas offers his dissent in Kimbrough to reiterate his
disagreement with the Court's remedial decision in Booker.260  As
mentioned previously, 261 Justice Thomas rejects his earlier acceptance of the
Booker remedy in Rita as "'statutory stare decisis,' [and is] now convinced
that there is no principled way to apply the Booker remedy--certainly not
one based on [§ 3553.y262 He believes the only prudent way forward is to
apply the Guidelines as mandatory, allowing the legislature to make any
necessary changes. 263  Like Justice Scalia, Justice Thomas argues for a
return to a mandatory sentencing scheme that requires any facts considered
in sentencing be admitted to by the defendant or found by a jury.2 6 He
concedes that while the outcome of Kimbrough might be reasonable from a
policy standpoint, it has "no basis in law. 265  Justice Thomas ends his
dissent by stating that, because the district court departed from the
"mandatory" Guidelines range, the judgment of the Fourth Circuit should be
affirmed, and the case should be remanded for resentencing.
266
Following Justice Thomas's dissent, Justice Alito's dissent in
Kimbrough is only three sentences long:
259. Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. at 577-78 (Thomas, J., dissenting); id. at 578-79 (Alito, J.,
dissenting).
260. Id. at 577-78 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 603 (Thomas, J., dissenting)
("Consistent with my dissenting opinion in Kimbrough v. United States, I would affirm the judgment
of the Court of Appeals because the District Court committed statutory error when it departed below
the applicable Guidelines range." (citation omitted)); supra notes 158-162 and accompanying text.
261. See supra Part lIl.A.2.c.
262. Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. at 578 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2475
(Scalia, J., dissenting)).
263. Id. While ignoring Booker as controlling is certainly an unconventional approach, Justice
Thomas makes perhaps the most logical conservative (strict constructionist) argument that can be
made: Why struggle with Congressional intent? Congress passed mandatory sentencing guidelines.
The Court could have simply severed the unconstitutional provisions and provided for, in those cases
in which it would apply, a mechanism that would require any fact increasing a defendant's sentence
to either be admitted to or proven by jury, thus not running afoul the Sixth Amendment.
264. Id. at 577-78. Indeed, keeping mandatory Guidelines intact but severing unconstitutional
applications of those "would have achieved compliance with the Sixth Amendment while doing the
least amount of violence to the mandatory sentencing regime that Congress enacted. The Court,
however, chose a more sweeping remedy. Despite acknowledging that under the mandatory
Guidelines not 'every sentence gives rise to a Sixth Amendment violation,' the Court rendered the
Guidelines advisory in their entirety and mandated appellate review of all sentences for
'reasonableness."' Id. (citation omitted) (citing Booker v. United States, 543 U.S. 220, 322-26
(2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting))).
265. Id. at 578.
266. Id.
799
For the reasons explained in my dissent in [Gall,] I would hold
that, under the remedial decision in [Booker,] a district judge is still
required to give significant weight to the policy decisions embodied
in the Guidelines. The Booker remedial decision, however, does not
permit a court of appeals to treat the Guidelines' policy decisions as
binding. I would not draw a distinction between the Guideline at
issue here and other Guidelines. Accordingly, I would vacate the
decision of the Court of Appeals and remand for reconsideration.26
However brief, Justice Alito's dissent deserves a closer look in light of
his dissent in Gall. He would elect to vacate the Fourth Circuit's judgment
and remand the case because Booker "does not permit a court of appeals to
treat the Guidelines' policy decisions as binding. 2 68 This is an interesting
position because, in a sense, it is conspicuously vague. His dissent would be
complete based solely on his disagreement with the appellate court's
reversal. He does not weigh in, as does the majority, on the reasonableness
of the district court. However, by including the language "under.. . Booker,
a district judge is still required to give significant weight to the policy
decisions," he suggests that the district court's downward departure did not
give significant weight to the policy decision that crack offenses should
carry harsher penalties than corresponding powder offenses. 269
So maybe both courts got it wrong. Unfortunately, because of the
brevity of Justice Alito's dissent, we are left guessing whether the district
court in Kimbrough merely "consulted" the Guidelines or sufficiently "took
them into account."27 Did the district court give "significant weight" to the
relevant sentencing range? 271
Having conducted a lengthy Sixth Amendment analysis relying on
numerous eighteenth century cases in Gall, 27 2 Justice Alito now replaces his
"original intent" hat with his "strict constructionist ' 273 hat, drawing "[no]
distinction between the Guideline at issue here and other Guidelines," thus
abridging the analysis.2 74 Switching from the Guidelines policy decisions to
the Guidelines themselves, Justice Alito makes clear the point he eluded to
in Gall: it is the responsibility of Congress and the Commission to establish
267. Id. at 578-79 (Alito, J., dissenting) (citing Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586 (2007);
Booker, 543 U.S. at 258-65).
268. Id. (citing Booker, 543 U.S. at 258-65).
269. Id. at 578 (citation omitted) (citing Booker, 543 U.S. at 258-65).
270. See Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 603-10 (Alito, J., dissenting).
271. Id.
272. See supra note 176 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Alito's view of the Sixth
Amendment implications of sentencing under the Guidelines).
273. See supra note 165 (defining the term "strict constructionism").
274. Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. at 578-79 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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the Guidelines; it is not up to the courts to pick and choose amongst the
Guidelines as to which ones merit adherence.
While Justice Alito's dissents in Gall and Kimbrough are consistent,
they offer little guidance for future analysis of Guidelines departure cases.
We are left to understand that district courts must not only "consult" the
Guidelines but must "take them into account. '2 75 Further, they must give
"significant weight" to the sentencing range under the Guidelines. 76  Of
course, appellate courts cannot "bind" district courts to the Guidelines policy
decisions.277 This is probably not the type of clarification lower courts are
looking for in this conflicted area of the law.
IV. IMPACT OF KIMBROUGH AND GALL
A. Legal Impact
Kimbrough and Gall have an enormous impact on federal sentencing.
The holdings not only result in thousands of potential federal petitions for
sentence vacatures 27' but also change the manner in which federal
defendants are now to be sentenced.279 While perhaps too late, Kimbrough
has finally addressed the crack/powder disparity to ostensibly temper the
harshness of crack sentencing. 280 Together, they establish a more clearly
defined application of Booker.25'
However, some important questions become apparent in the wake of the
Kimbrough and Gall decisions. What sentencing rules are we to glean from
the holdings? How do these two decisions impact the future roles of the
district courts, federal circuit courts, defense attorneys, and federal probation
officers? What is the state of the Guidelines in the wake of Kimbrough and
275. See Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 604 (Alito, J., dissenting) ("District courts must not only 'consult' the
Guidelines, they must 'take them into account."' (quoting United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220,
264 (2005))); see also supra note 169 (discussing the difference, if any, between "consulting" versus
"taking into account").
276. Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 604 (Alito, J., dissenting) ("[S]entencing judges must still give the
Guidelines' policy decisions some significant weight and that the courts of appeals must still police
compliance."); see supra note 169.
277. Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. at 579 (Alito, J., dissenting) ("Booker... does not permit a court of
appeals to treat the Guidelines' policy decisions as binding.").
278. See infra Part IV.B.
279. See infra Part IV.A.3.
280. See infra notes 350-352 and accompanying text (discussing the Guidelines amendment for
crack in relation to Kimbrough).
281. See supra notes 56-60 and accompanying text (discussing the "advisory" application of the
Guidelines pursuant to Booker).
Gall? Should the new standards established be applied retroactively or only
prospectively? Is there added stability and predictability to Booker under the
Gall majority's holding? This section of the article addresses those
questions and others, illustrating the significant consequences of these two
cases.
1. What the Holdings Clearly Establish
Against the backdrop of the "advisory" nature of the Guidelines
pursuant to Booker,252 Gall ultimately stands for the proposition that district
courts are free to depart from the Guidelines 283 and, in doing so, are not
required to justify the departure with any sort of proportionality test devised
to weigh the amount of departure against the circumstances giving rise to
it.2 14 A district court must, however, still "give serious consideration to the
extent of any departure ... and must explain [its] conclusion that an
unusually lenient or an unusually harsh sentence is appropriate in a
particular case with sufficient justifications., 285  This is really nothing new,
except the Court wants to curb the appellate court practice of devising
proportionality tests to justify the degree of departure from the
Guidelines.286
Perhaps the most clearly defined "rule" to be taken from Gall is that the
standard of review for district court sentences under the Guidelines is abuse-
of-discretion. 287  The Gall Court has now made "pellucidly" clear what it
meant in Booker when it established a "reasonableness" standard of
282. See supra notes 56-60 and accompanying text (discussing the "advisory" application of the
Guidelines pursuant to Booker).
283. See supra note 108 (reiterating the "advisory" nature of the Guidelines).
284. See supra notes 112-115 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's dismissal of a
proportionality requirement in Guidelines departures).
285. Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 594 (2007).
286. Id. at 596 ("Most importantly, both the exceptional circumstances requirement and the rigid
mathematical formulation reflect a practice-common among courts that have adopted 'proportional
review'-of applying a heightened standard of review to sentences outside the Guidelines range.
This is inconsistent with the rule that the abuse-of-discretion standard of review applies to appellate
review of all sentencing decisions-whether inside or outside the Guidelines range."). It is not clear
that the standard set in Gall for departure from the Guidelines is any different than the Eighth
Circuit's approach, which the Court reverses and criticizes so harshly. Compare id. at 594 ("It
is ... clear that a district judge must give serious consideration to the extent of any departure from
the Guidelines and must explain his conclusion that an unusually lenient or an unusually harsh
sentence is appropriate in a particular case with sufficient justifications."), and id. at 597 ("We find
it uncontroversial that a major departure should be supported by a more significant justification than
a minor one."), with United States v. Claiborne, 439 F.3d 479, 481 (8th Cir. 2006) ("An
extraordinary reduction must be supported by extraordinary circumstances." (quoting United States
v. Dalton, 404 F.3d 1029, 1033 (8th Cir. 2005))).
287. See supra note 109 and accompanying text (discussing the abuse-of-discretion standard for
review of sentences under Booker).
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appellate review.2 8 Whether Gall is intended to clarify the Court's holding
in Booker or broaden it, there can be only one interpretation of its effect: a
win for proponents of judicial sentencing discretion.289
Kimbrough extends the Gall analysis to cases involving cocaine
sentencing, addressing the crack/powder disparity. 290 The Kimbrough rule is
simply this: a district court judge is free to consider its disagreement with
the crack/powder cocaine disparity as a factor in its departure from the
Guidelines.29' At first blush, this appears to be a straightforward principle.
However as discussed below, Kimbrough unleashes a flurry of practical
implications.292
2. Perhaps Not Quite the Majority It Appears to Be
An important point to consider is that in no way should these two cases
be considered a clear majority of the Court. One might be tempted to see a
7-2 decision and chalk it up to an ironclad majority. However, that is
simply not the case in Kimbrough and Gall. A closer look reveals a
substantive 5-4 split in the Court-still every bit as fractured as it was in
Booker.293  Justices Thomas and Souter do not conceal the fact that they
would happily return to a system of mandatory sentencing guidelines with
an enhancement provision consistent with the Sixth Amendment.294 Justices
Scalia and Alito seem to be in the same camp. 295 Examining their individual
288. See supra note 109 and accompanying text (discussing the varying views as to whether the
Booker Court really made it "pellucidly" clear that a "reasonableness" review of sentences actually
meant an abuse-of-discretion standard).
289. See Robert Barnes, Justices Reinforce Leeway on Sentences, WASH. POST, Dec. 11, 2007, at
Al, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/12/10/AR2007121
000558.html?sid=ST2007121000825 (discussing the characterization of Kimbrough and Gall by
Ohio State University's Douglas A. Berman, law professor and sentencing expert, as "a major
victory for criminal defendants and for district court judges who can use discretion in sentencing
now that the guidelines are advisory only").
290. See Kimbrough v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 558 (2007).
291. See supra text accompanying note 246 (quoting the Court's declaration that sentencing
judges can consider their disagreement with the crack/powder disparity as a sentencing factor).
Also, it is important to remember that the Commission's November 2007 amendment to the
Guidelines has tempered the crack/powder sentencing disparity. See supra note 33 (discussing the
two level reduction for crack offenses pursuant to the 2007 Guidelines amendment).
292. See discussion infra Parts IV.A.3-V.
293. See infra notes 296-310 and accompanying text (discussing the views of Justices Scalia,
Thomas, Souter, and Alito regarding their dissatisfaction with the remedy fashioned in Booker).
294. See infra notes 296-300 and accompanying text (discussing the disapproval of Booker by
Justices Thomas and Souter).
295. See infra notes 301-310 and accompanying text (discussing the disapproval of Booker by
commentaries on the issue reveals that all four would be more content under
a mandatory sentencing scheme.
The most obvious place to start is with Justice Thomas, who simply
refuses to accept Booker as stare decisis. 296 Many criticize Justice Thomas
as frequently being unwilling to operate under the doctrine of stare decisis
altogether.2 97  While that might be an overly broad generalization, it
certainly holds true in his Gall dissent, where he expressly dismisses Booker
as binding precedent. 298  He makes his position crystal clear in his
Kimbrough dissent: "I think it best to apply the [sentencing statute excised
under Booker] as written.., which makes the Guidelines mandatory."2 99 It
seems fair to characterize Justice Thomas's position as an unequivocal
endorsement for a return to "mandatory" Guidelines.
Justice Souter's stance on the issue is equally clear. In his Gall
concurrence, Justice Souter states the following:
After Booker's remedial holding, I continue to think that the best
resolution of the tension between substantial consistency throughout
the system and the right of jury trial would be a new Act of
Congress: reestablishing a statutory system of mandatory
sentencing guidelines (though not identical to the original in all
points of detail), but providing for jury findings of all facts
necessary to set the upper range of sentencing discretion.300
It would be hard to imagine a more vivid pronouncement of his position on
the matter.
Like Justice Souter, Justice Scalia never wanted to make the Guidelines
"advisory." In Rita, Justice Scalia reiterated this viewpoint:
Justices Scalia and Alito).
296. See supra notes 158-162 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Thomas's refusal to
accept Booker as stare decisis).
297. See, e.g., Natalie Rainforth, Note, Campaign Finance and Randall v. Sorrell: How Much Is
Too Much and Who Decides? The Court's Splintering Devotion to Its Own Problematic Framework,
35 PEPP. L. REv. 161, 198 n.229 (2007) ("Unlike Justice Breyer, Justice Thomas has no qualms
about dispensing with long-existing precedent." (citing Randall v. Sorrell, 126 S. Ct. 2479, 2502
(2006) (Thomas, J., concurring only in the judgment))); Douglas T. Kendall, A Big Question About
Clarence Thomas, WASH. POST, Oct. 14, 2004, at A31, available at http://www.washingtonpost.
comfwp-dyn/articles/A31117-20040ctl3.html (quoting Justice Scalia as saying Justice Thomas
"doesn't believe in stare decisis, period").
298. See Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 603 (2007) (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also supra
notes 158-162 and accompanying text.
299. Kimbrough v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 558, 578 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also supra
note 162 (quoting Justice Thomas in his abandonment of Booker as stare decisis).
300. Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 603 (Souter, J., concurring) (emphasis added) (citing Rita v. United States,
127 S. Ct. 2456, 2463-64 (2007)).
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I disagreed with [Booker], believing instead that the proper remedy
was to maintain the mandatory character of the Guidelines and
simply to require, for that small category of cases in which a fact
was legally essential to the sentence imposed, that the fact be
proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt or admitted by the
defendant.3 '
Justice Scalia did not repeat this sentiment in Gall or Kimbrough,30 2 but
it follows from his tone in both concurrences and from his ongoing
discussions about the Sixth Amendment implications that he only
grudgingly accepts the Guidelines system in place.303
Justice Alito is the only of the four justices not to expressly state his
wish to go back to a mandatory sentencing scheme, yet. However, his
dissents in Kimbrough and Gall strongly suggest he would be a more-than-
willing participant in a movement to abandon the "advisory" Guidelines for
something less amorphous.3°  In Gall, he spent a great deal of time
disagreeing with the deference accorded to district courts in sentencing
under the majority view.30 5 The tone of his dissent is apparent in his
expression of concern that since "sentencing judges need only give lip
service to the Guidelines" the result will be that "sentencing disparities will
gradually increase. 30 6  He goes to great lengths to distinguish between
"consulting" the Guidelines and "taking the Guidelines into account., 30 7
That distinction may sound like an exercise in semantics, but it seems
unsubtle that when Justice Alito says sentencing courts must "take the
Guidelines into account," he means "follow the Guidelines." Perhaps more
pointed is the cutting remark from his dissent in Gall: "I recognize that the
Court is committed to the Blakely-Booker line of cases, but we are not
required to continue along a path that will take us further and further off
301. Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2475 (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis added) (citing United States v.
Booker 543 U.S. 220, 272-91 (2005) (Stevens, J., joined by Scalia & Souter, JJ., dissenting in part)).
302. See Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 602-03 (Scalia, J., concurring); Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. at 576-77
(Scalia, J., concurring).
303. See infra text accompanying note 311 (quoting Justice Scalia as reluctantly accepting Booker
as stare decisis).
304. See Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. at 578-79 (Alito, J., dissenting); Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 603-10 (Alito,
J., dissenting).
305. See Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 603-10 (Alito, J., dissenting).
306. Id. at 604.
307. See supra notes 168-169 and accompanying text (discussing the semantic confusion between
the terms "consulting" the Guidelines, "taking [the Guidelines] into account," and "giving significant
weight" to the Guidelines).
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course."308 That statement follows his discussion over Booker "und[oing]"
the Sentencing Reform Act 30 9 and seems to denote his opinion that
mandatory sentencing must have been on course.310 Even if the tone of his
dissent is not persuasive, the fact that he is one of the two dissenters in both
cases broadening judicial sentencing discretion should be a convincing
indicator of his disposition toward the advisory application of the
Guidelines.
So with four Justices clearly unhappy with the current sentencing
scheme, what is the likelihood of going back to mandatory sentencing?
Probably not very high. Even if the Court were to acquire a fifth Justice in
support of regression back to mandatory Guidelines, Justice Scalia has made
it clear he does "not mean to reopen that debate. As a matter of statutory
stare decisis, [he] accept[s] Booker's remedial holding that district courts are
no longer bound by the Guidelines ...., So as intriguing as such a
possibility might be, the reality is that Congress and the Commission will
likely continue to refine the Guidelines as "advisory."
3. Application of Guidelines Post-Kimbrough/Gall
The next questions that should be addressed are: How does Kimbrough
and Gall change the day to day operations of the district courts? And what
new responsibilities are now faced by district courts, appellate courts,
federal probation officers, and defense attorneys?
The majority opinion in Gall laid out a four-step procedure for district
courts to follow when departing from the Guidelines. 31 2 Stated most simply,
the court must:
308. Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 606 (Alito, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
309. 1984 Act, supra note 16.
310. Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 606 (Alito, J., dissenting) ("A sentencing system that gives trial judges the
discretion to sentence within a specified range not only permits judicial factfinding that may increase
a sentence, such a system also gives individual judges discretion to implement their own sentencing
policies. This latter feature, whether wise or unwise, has nothing to do with the concerns of the
Sixth Amendment, and a principal objective of the Sentencing Reform Act was to take this power
out of the hands of individual district judges. The Booker remedy, however, undid this
congressional choice. In curing the Sentencing Reform Act's perceived defect regarding judicial
factfinding ..." (emphasis added)).
311. Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2475 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring).
312. See Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 596-97. While the Court did not actually number the steps of the
procedure, it took a very formulated approach in laying out its expectations. Id. (citing Rita, 127 S.
Ct. 2456).
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1. Correctly calculate the applicable range under the
Guidelines.
313
2. Allow both sides the opportunity to argue for an appropriate
sentence.3 14
3. Consider all of the § 3553(a) factors to see if they support a
requested sentence.315
4. Adequately explain the sentence chosen to provide for a
meaningful appellate review.3t 6
This procedure is probably not much different than that used by district
courts post-Booker, except that much more emphasis will be placed on the
§ 3553(a) factors and record-building. 17
While it always seems convenient to get a clear, established rule or test
from the Court, this one turns out being a bit of a double-edged sword. With
such bright-line instruction, district courts are now free to tailor their
sentencing colloquy to solidify what might otherwise be an excessive
departure from the Guidelines.31 8 Conversely, a sentencing judge could
313. Id. at 596 ("As we explained in Rita, a district court should begin all sentencing proceedings
by correctly calculating the applicable Guidelines range. As a matter of administration and to secure
nationwide consistency, the Guidelines should be the starting point and the initial benchmark."
(citation omitted) (citing Rita, 127 S. Ct. 2456)).
314. Id.
315. Id. at 596-97 ("[A]fter giving both parties an opportunity to argue for whatever sentence they
deem appropriate, the district judge should then consider all of the § 3553(a) factors to determine
whether they support the sentence requested by a party. In so doing, he may not presume that the
Guidelines range is reasonable. He must make an individualized assessment based on the facts
presented. If he decides that an outside-Guidelines sentence is warranted, he must consider the
extent of the deviation and ensure that the justification is sufficiently compelling to support the
degree of the variance. We find it uncontroversial that a major departure should be supported by a
more significant justification than a minor one." (footnote omitted) (citing Rita, 127 S. Ct. 2456)). It
is quite likely the application of number three has the potential of creating lengthy records in which
the sentencing judges must discuss all of the individual § 3553(a) factors as they relate to the
defendant being sentenced. There is one more very important point to make about the requirement
of the sentencing court to discuss all of the § 3553(a) factors. In applying these criteria to the facts
in Gall, the court reasoned that "[s]ince the District Judge correctly calculated and carefully
reviewed the Guidelines range, he necessarily gave significant weight and consideration to the need
to avoid unwarranted disparities." Id. at 599 (emphasis added). The court appears to suggest that by
simply calculating the Guidelines, the district court has fulfilled its responsibility of considering the
need to avoid unwarranted disparities under § 3553(a).
316. Id. at 597 ("After settling on the appropriate sentence, he must adequately explain the chosen
sentence to allow for meaningful appellate review and to promote the perception of fair sentencing."
(citing Rita, 127 S. Ct. 2456)).
317. See supra note 315 (discussing the criteria outlined by the Supreme Court in Gall for
consideration of the § 3553(a) factors by district courts prior to departure from the Guidelines).
318. There is always the possibility that a sentencing judge could meticulously build the type of
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virtually slam the door shut on any hope for an appeal by making it clear, on
the record, that her thoughtful consideration of all of the § 3553 factors led
her to unequivocal agreement with the Guidelines range.
Gall did not focus solely on the sentencing courts, but included the
expectations of reviewing courts. 319  Enumerated, the procedure would
appear as follows:
1. Ensure the district court did not commit procedural error.320
2. If no procedural error occurred, review for substantive error
under abuse-of-discretion standard.32'
3. If the sentence is within the Guidelines range, the court may
apply a presumption of reasonableness. 322
4. If the sentence falls outside the Guidelines range, the reviewing
court cannot apply a presumption of unreasonableness.323
Although this is a highly deferential standard, district courts are not free to
"give lip service to the Guidelines." 324  The Supreme Court in Gall was
careful in its admonition that "even though the Guidelines are advisory
rather than mandatory, they are ... the product of careful study based on
extensive empirical evidence derived from the review of thousands of
individual sentencing decisions., 325 Prior to Gall, appellate courts reviewed
sentences for "reasonableness," so not much has changed in the way of
record Gall calls for, but overstate the § 3553 factors in order to accomplish an extraordinary
departure from the Guidelines. In fact, it did not take long for sentencing judges to push Gall to its
outer limits. See United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179 (11th Cir. 2008) (vacating a district court
sentence of five years probation awarded to a defendant for a child pornography offense that yielded
a Guidelines range of 97 to 120 months).
319. See Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 597.
320. Id. ("[T]he appellate court... under an abuse-of-discretion standard... must first ensure that
the district court committed no significant procedural error, such as failing to calculate (or
improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to
consider the § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to
adequately explain the chosen sentence-including an explanation for any deviation from the
Guidelines range.").
321. Id. ("When conducting this review, the court will, of course, take into account the totality of
the circumstances, including the extent of any variance from the Guidelines range.").
322. Id.
323. Id. ("[I]f the sentence is outside the Guidelines range, the court may not apply a presumption
of unreasonableness. It may consider the extent of the deviation, but must give due deference to the
district court's decision that the § 3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify the extent of the variance. The
fact that the appellate court might reasonably have concluded that a different sentence was
appropriate is insufficient to justify reversal of the district court." (emphasis added)).
324. Id. at 604 (Alito, J., dissenting).
325. Id. at 594 (majority opinion).
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standard of review. The biggest impact on the appellate courts is the wave
of sentencing appeals likely to result from Kimbrough and Gall. 326
Rarely mentioned is the burden placed on federal probation departments
by changes in sentencing practice. Federal probation officers are generally
responsible for conducting presentencing investigations and preparing
reports used by district courts for sentencing. 327 The presentence report
includes all of the relevant sentencing information about the defendant,
including a calculation of his Guidelines range for the offense committed. 328
The holdings in Kimbrough and Gall make it clear that probation officers
now need to conduct a more thorough examination of § 3553(a) factors for
consideration in possible Guidelines departures cases.
As discussed below, the crack Guidelines amendment is applied
retroactively. 329 That means federal probation officers have to go through
their files in order to determine who is eligible for the two level sentence
reduction for their crack-related offenses. 330 They must then formulate a
triage system with which to determine priority of resentencing hearings. It
would be likely that those with release dates in the very near future and
those with release dates in the distant future would not be affected as acutely
as someone with a release date a few years away. Also, sentences of those
convicted for offenses involving larger amounts of cocaine are still bound by
statutory minimum terms.
Finally, defense attorneys must change the way they do business in light
of Kimbrough and Gall. A defense attorney who does not argue vigorously
for a reduced sentence based on any applicable § 3553(a) factors would be
neglecting his responsibilities, particularly in crack prosecutions. That raises
the question of whether a criminal defense attorney could be held liable for
failure to make such an argument when compelling § 3553(a) factors exist
but were overlooked in the pre-sentencing investigation.
326. See discussion infra Parts IV.B-V.
327. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c) ("The probation officer must conduct a presentence investigation
and submit a report to the court before it imposes sentence ... .
328. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(d).
329. See infra note 331 and accompanying text (discussing press release of the crack Guidelines
amendment issued by the Commission).
330. See supra note 33 (discussing the two level reduction for crack offenses pursuant to
Guidelines amendment).
809
B. Unanswered Questions and Practical Implications
1. The High Price of Retroactivity
An issue also exists as to the cost effectiveness of any retroactive
applications of Kimbrough and Gall. In December 2007, the Commission
issued a press release stating that pursuant to the Guidelines amendment, a
two level sentence reduction for crack offenses would be retroactively
applied effective March 2008."' What about those who argue their
sentences should be reduced further than two levels, based on compelling
§ 3553(a) factors in light of Gall?
The result of Kimbrough and Gall is essentially the creation of three
types of resentencing petitions. First, there are those petitioners who just
want their two level reduction in accordance with the retroactive sentencing
amendment. Second, there are those who qualify for the two level reduction
but wish to argue for a further downward departure based on their § 3553(a)
factors.332 A third category consists of those not necessarily charged with a
cocaine offense who argue, and perhaps have a record to support their
argument, that the only reason they were not awarded a sentence below the
Guidelines range is because their sentencing judge was bound by the pre-
Gall Guidelines. Even if courts limit sentence appeals to those qualifying
for the amended crack sentence, the impact is enormous. 333
In November 2007, the Assistant Director of the Witness Security and
Prisoner Operations Division of the U.S. Marshall's Service (the USMS)
testified before the Commission regarding the impact of retroactivity of the
crack amendment on the USMS.334  He estimated that as many as 19,500
inmates could be eligible for travel back to district courts for resentencing at
331. Press Release, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, U.S. Sentencing Commission Votes Unanimously
To Apply Amendment Retroactively For Crack Cocaine Offenses (Dec. 11, 2007),
http://www.ussc.gov/PRESS/rell21107.htm. While the amendment provided courts with a three-
month lag to prepare, courts have granted resentencing hearings for qualifying cases prior to the
effective date of the amendment. See, e.g., United States v. Wood, No. CR-88-0723 (CPS), 2008
WL 399253 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 12, 2008) (reducing a convict's sentence based on the retroactive
amendments before March 3, 2008).
332. Aside from stating that any amended sentence must still comply with statutory minimum
sentencing, the amendment also generally prohibits reductions when the original sentence was
reduced pursuant to Booker. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § IBI.10(b)(2)(B) (2007)
(amended 2008), available at http://www.ussc.gov/2007guid/030308rf.pdf ("However, if the
original term of imprisonment constituted a nonguideline sentence determined pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) and United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), a further reduction generally would not
be appropriate.").
333. See infra text accompanying note 335.
334. See Hearing on Impact of Crack Cocaine Amendment If Made Retroactive Before the U.S.
Sentencing Comm "n (Nov. 13, 2007) (briefing statement of Sylvester E. Jones, Assistant Director,
Witness Security and Prisoner Operations, U.S. Marshall Service), available at http://www.ussc.gov/
hearings/I 1_13_07/JonesTestimony.pdf [hereinafter Jones Briefing Statement].
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a cost of $38 million for housing alone. 335  The average transportation cost
for one prisoner resentencing is $1,100, which would be an aggregate
transportation cost of $42.9 million.33 6  His testimony concluded with a
summary of the enormous cost and strain on personnel that would be
incurred by the USMS if the retroactivity was to be instituted.
337
Those figures do not consider the second and third category of sentence
appeals outlined above. 338  In order to maintain any sort of order and
uniformity, sentencing courts are best served by only reducing sentences
pursuant to the amended Guidelines and not creating "Gall motions" or
"Kimbrough motions" based on § 3553(a) considerations. 339 This position is
grounded in statutory support. Section 3582(c)(2)3 40 allows for resentencing
based on Guidelines revisions by the Commission but the amended
Guidelines do not provide for a full resentencing.341
335. Id. at 1-2; see Darryl Fears, Crack-Sentencing Reductions Decried, WASH. POST, Feb. 7,
2008, at A02, available at http://www.washingtonpost.con/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/0
2 /06/
AR2008020603822.html ("In a statement prepared for his scheduled appearance before the House
Judiciary Committee today, Attorney General Michael B. Mukasey said that unless Congress acts,
'1,600 convicted crack dealers, many of them violent gang members, will be eligible for immediate
release into communities nationwide' under a decision by the U.S. Sentencing Commission.").
336. Jones Briefing Statement, supra note 334, at 4.
337. Id. at 5-6 ("In summary, bringing 19,500 prisoners back for resentencing hearings would
result in an enormous additional workload and may require that manpower and funding be diverted
from task forces, protection details and new initiatives like the Adam Walsh Child Protection and
Safety Act for which the USMS is the lead agency. Add this to the burden 19,500 prisoners would
place on a transportation system, JPATS, already working at maximum capacity; a prisoner housing
shortage in key areas of the country and the strain on manpower due to the high volume of drug,
terrorism and immigration cases ... with which the USMS is already dealing and you can see why
the USMS is concerned with the possibility of the Crack Cocaine Amendment becoming
retroactive.").
338. See supra text accompanying note 332. Consider cases involving defendants who have been
sentenced for federal crack cocaine offenses under the Guidelines prior to Kimbrough and Gall. If
they are able to construct a colorable argument that they would have been given a sentence reduced
by more than two levels based on their individual records but for strict adherence to the 100-to-I
ratio, should their claim be foreclosed by the crack amendment?
339. See supra note 122 (listing all of the factors under § 3553(a)).
340. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (2006) ("[I1n the case of a defendant who has been sentenced to a
term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the
Sentencing Commission pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 994(o), upon motion of the defendant or the Director
of the Bureau of Prisons, or on its own motion, the court may reduce the term of imprisonment, after
considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if such a
reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.").
341. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1Bl.10(a)(3) (2007) (amended 2008),
available at http://www.ussc.gov/2007guid/030308rf.pdf ("[P]roceedings under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(2) and this policy statement do not constitute a full resentencing of the defendant.").
2. Correcting One Disparity Only to Create Another
It is often said that the road to hell is paved with good intentions. While
perhaps well-intentioned, Kimbrough and Gall have the potential of moving
courts further away from the consistency envisioned by the Commission. In
Booker, Justice Scalia stated that "logic compels the conclusion that the
sentencing judge, after considering the recited factors (including the
Guidelines), has full discretion, as full as what he possessed before the[1984] Act was passed, to sentence anywhere within the statutory range. ' '342
Failure to practice judicial restraint will result in the return of sentencing
courts to the slippery indeterminate slope upon which they operated prior to
the Guidelines.343 Kimbrough and Gall illustrate this point.
In Kimbrough, the Government argued that sentencing disparities would
arise based on varying views of the crack/powder disparity from one district
court to the next. 3" Instead of addressing that very legitimate concern, the
Court responded with the assurance that the system would "take care of
it. ' '34 5 That response is less than comforting. As demonstrated in Figures 1-
8, district courts have clearly departed from the Guidelines at an increased
rate post-Booker.346  District court sentences fell within the Guidelines
ranges around 70% of the time in 2003, 2004, and pre-Booker 2005.,3 4
However, those "within Guidelines" percentages dropped to less than 62%
in post-Booker 2005 and throughout 2006.48 Will that percentage continue
to decrease insomuch as Gall and Kimbrough allow it to happen? 349
342. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 305 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
343. See supra note 18 (discussing the failure of indeterminate sentencing to provide any sort of
uniformity or consistency between sentences for similarly situated defendants).
344. See supra notes 241-242 and accompanying text (outlining the Government's argument that
different judges would sentence defendants inconsistently based on each judges' feeling towards the
crack/powder disparity).
345. See supra notes 241-242 and accompanying text (quoting the Court's assertion that advisory
Guidelines coupled with appellate review will help ensure consistent sentencing practices). But cf
Booker, 543 U.S. at 305 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (."[A]void[ing] unwarranted sentence disparities
among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct' ... would
require a judge to adhere to the Guidelines only if all other judges had to adhere to the Guidelines
(which they certainly do not, as the Court holds today) or if all other judges could at least be
expected to adhere to the Guidelines (which they certainly cannot, given the notorious unpopularity
of the Guidelines with many district judges)" (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6))).
346. See Appendix, infra (displaying Guidelines departures statistics from 2001 to 2006).
347. See Appendix, infra figs. 3-6 (displaying Guidelines departures statistics from 2003 to pre-
Booker 2005).
348. See Appendix, infra figs. 7-8 (displaying Guidelines departures statistics from post-Booker
2005 to 2006).
349. Somehow, the Gall Court managed to both marginalize the Guidelines and praise them at the
same time. See Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 594 (2007) ("[E]ven though the Guidelines are
advisory rather than mandatory, they are, as we pointed out in Rita, the product of careful study
based on extensive empirical evidence derived from the review of thousands of individual
sentencing decisions." (citing Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456 (2007))). The Court then goes
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Even more disturbing is the idea that the Kimbrough Court
acknowledges the amendment to the Guidelines reducing the 100-to-I ratio
but fails to factor that into its analysis.35° Instead, the Court turns its collar
to the cold reality that not only will convicted crack traffickers be subject to
a lower Guidelines range in the future,35 ' but thanks to Kimbrough, judges
will have the option of disagreeing with any remaining "disparity" in the
crack/powder ratio and reducing the sentence even further. This is expressly
the reason why Justice Alito states, in the closing line of Kimbrough, that
"[he] would not draw a distinction between the Guideline at issue... and
other Guidelines. 352  If a sentencing judge is free to disagree with the
crack/powder disparity, why not disagree with the amount of heroine or any
other drug on the sentencing schedule under the Guidelines? This is the
precarious precedent set by Kimbrough.
To fully appreciate the effects of Kimbrough and Gall, consider the
following hypothetical situation: Imagine a scenario with a twenty-year-old
college student and a twenty-year-old drug dealer. The drug dealer has been
selling crack and committing other related crimes for the last two years.
Somehow he has managed to evade law enforcement, thus having no
criminal record. The college student has never committed a crime and lived
an exemplary life, but in a terrible lapse of judgment, he agrees to accept
payment of a large sum of money in exchange for driving a car with a sealed
trunk from point A to point B. He knows he is probably doing something
wrong, but needing the money, he gives into the pressure. He is pulled over
by the police to discover he is trafficking 4.9 grams of crack. Coincidentally
the drug dealer is arrested on the same evening in the adjacent federal court
district carrying the exact same amount of crack.
on to distinguish drugs as the exception because the drug Guidelines ranges were keyed off of
Congress's mandatory minimum statutes. Id.
350. Kimbrough was decided on December 10, 2007 and included the following statement in a
footnote: "The Commission has not yet determined whether the [crack] amendment will be
retroactive to cover defendants like Kimbrough." Kimbrough v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 558, 569
n. 11(2007). The following day, on December 11, 2007, the Commission issued a press release
entitled "U.S. Sentencing Commission Votes Unanimously to Apply Amendment Retroactively for
Crack Cocaine Offenses." See Press Release, supra note 331 (discussing the Commission's press
release that crack offenses would receive a two level reduction under the Guidelines). Does the U.S.
Supreme Court not have the Commission's phone number?
351. See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text (discussing the two level reduction for crack
offenses after the Guidelines amendment was passed).
352. Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. at 579 (Alito, J., dissenting); see supra notes 267-269 and
accompanying text (discussing Justice Alito's dissent in Gall).
Lucky for both of them, 4.9 grams falls just beneath the mandatory
minimum sentencing statute.3 3  On sentencing day the judge rejects the
college student's deliberate ignorance defense. 54 The two different judges
calculate the sentencing range under the Guidelines and both arrive at thirty-
three to forty-one months. 355  The judge sentencing the drug dealer,
sympathetic to first-time offenders, delivers an extensive and moving
colloquy, listing all of the § 3553(a) factors in detail.356 Just as in Gall, the
judge relies heavily on the drug dealer's age and substance abuse problems,
ultimately deciding to sentence the drug dealer to probation. 57 In contrast,
the judge sentencing the college student launches into a tirade about the evils
of drug use and the need to make examples of drug traffickers. The judge
relies on the identical § 3553(a) factors to prove that the college student
squandered his opportunity at a good life and sentences the student to forty-
one months in prison.358
Given that scenario, the seemingly excessive sentence given to the
student would fall within the Guidelines and therefore be presumptively
reasonable upon appellate review.3 59 Because the drug dealer's sentencing
judge built such a thorough and compelling record, the drug dealer's
probation sentence would likely be upheld, vis-A-vis Gall.3 60 Upon reading
such an extreme hypothetical situation, one's first reaction might be to
353. See supra note 24 and accompanying text (citing federal statute prescribing five year
minimum prison sentence for crack offenses involving at least five grams of crack).
354. "Deliberate ignorance" is the term often used by courts to describe the actions of defendants
who are aware of a high probability that they are committing a crime but intentionally choose to
avoid or ignore the truth regarding their own criminal wrongdoing. See generally Ira P. Robbins,
The Ostrich Instruction: Deliberate Ignorance as a Criminal Mens Rea, 81 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 191 (1990) (discussing the different practical and philosophical approaches to the
doctrine of deliberate ignorance); see also Jessica A. Kozlov-Davis, A Hybrid Approach to the Use
of Deliberate Ignorance in Conspiracy Cases, 100 MICH. L. REV. 473 (2001) (comparing different
approaches to deliberate ignorance, including that of the Model Penal Code, but with more of a focus
on how courts have used the deliberate ignorance instruction in the context of conspiracy cases).
355. This hypothetical involves two individuals with no criminal history, which would place them
in Criminal History Category I under the Guidelines. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL§ 4A 1. (2007). Trafficking 4.9 grams of crack would place the base offense level at 20. See id.§ 2Dl.I. Considering no other sentencing factors, a defendant in Criminal History Category I who
committed a crime at offense level 20 would be subject to a sentencing range of thirty-three to forty-
one months under the Guidelines. See id. §5A.
356. See supra note 122 (listing all of the factors under § 3553(a)).
357. See supra notes 137-145 and accompanying text (discussing the courts inappropriate reliance
on Gall's age and chemical dependency as factors in an extraordinary downward departure from the
Guidelines).
358. See supra note 122 (listing all of the factors under § 3553(a)).
359. See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text (discussing the rule from Rita, that a sentence
within its prescribed Guidelines range is presumptively reasonable for purposes of appellate review).
360. See supra note 316 and accompanying text (stating the importance of adequately explaining
the sentence chosen by the sentencing judge on the record to provide for meaningful review upon
appeal).
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dismiss it. But consider the facts of Gall: Brian Gall was convicted of
conspiracy to sell over 2,500 grams of ecstacy over the course of seven
months and he was sentenced to probation.36' That sentence is trivial by any
standard, except perhaps that of the Supreme Court. 
3 62
That raises the issue of Brian Gall's individual situation. The record
indicates that Gall really did rehabilitate while out on bail awaiting trial.
363
He turned his life around, which is the central purpose of the criminal justice
system. But what facilitated this turnaround? Why did he quit selling drugs
in the first place? He quit over "concerns that [one of his co-conspirators]
was telling too many people about their ecstasy distribution business.3
This is a crucial point. Brian Gall quit selling drugs because he was afraid
of prosecution.
The majority portrayed Gall's withdrawal much more favorably than the
facts in the record.365 Some might argue: "What difference does it make
why he withdrew? He withdrew." That is the logic of the majority, but it
misses the mark. Brian Gall likely never would have withdrawn from such a
lucrative conspiracy had he known the penalty would be probation. The
only reasonable inference to be drawn is that Gall was operating under the
reasonable assumption that the penalty for his criminal conduct was a
lengthy prison term, which in fact it was under the Guidelines.36 6  So
361. See supra Part III.A.1 (reciting the facts of Gall, including his earning of over $30,000
during his participation in the conspiracy).
362. See supra notes 116-117 and accompanying notes (questioning the Court's description of the
"hardships" of probation). The district court in Gall relies on three cases, one unreported, to support
its assertion that "[o]ther courts have recognized ... the Guidelines calculations based on drug
amount may overrepresent the actual offense conduct." See United States v. Gall, 374 F. Supp. 2d
758, 764 n.5 (S.D. Iowa 2005), rev'd, 446 F.3d 884 (8th Cir. 2006), rev'd, 128 S. Ct. 586 (2007).
However, all three cases cited, even after significant downward departures, resulted in lengthy prison
sentences. See id. (citing United States v. Smith, 359 F. Supp. 2d 771, 776 (E.D. Wis. 2005)
(departing from Guidelines range of 121 to 151 months to sentence defendant to 18 months in prison
followed by five years of supervised release based in large part on the court's disagreement with the
100-to-I cocaine ratio); United States v. Nellum, No. 2:04-CR-30-PS, 2005 WL 300073, at *5 (N.D.
Ind. Feb. 3, 2005) (departing from Guidelines range of 168 to 210 months to sentence defendant to
108 months in prison followed by four years of supervised release relying, in part, on 100-to-I
cocaine ratio); United States v. Huerta-Rodriguez, 355 F. Supp. 2d 1019, 1026 n. 6 (D. Neb. 2005)
(departing from proposed Guidelines range of 57 to 70 months to sentence defendant to 36 months in
prison followed by three years of supervised release if not deported)). Remarkably, the district court
offers no cases involving a sentence of only probation, like that given to Gall. See id.
363. See supra Part IlI.A.1 (reciting the facts of Gall, including his quitting drugs, turning his
back on crime, and successfully starting his own business).
364. United States v. Gall, 446 F.3d 884, 886 (8th Cir. 2006), rev'd, 128 S. Ct. 586 (2007).
365. See supra note 88 (discussing the very different perspectives of Gall's "voluntary"
withdrawal from the conspiracy).
366. See supra note 95 and accompanying text (explaining that Gall's sentencing range under the
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according to the record, the Guidelines actually worked to deter Gall from
further criminal behavior. The Court's reaction to this reality is to dismiss
the Guidelines, thus doing a disservice to the next drug dealer with the
sanguine hopes that if he gets caught he will receive a sentence of probation.
V. CONCLUSION
Federal judges need a certain amount of discretion in sentencing
criminal defendants. If sentencing is to be nothing more than a calculation
of numbers predetermined by a probation officer, then why have sentencingjudges at all? The Court in Gall was faced with a very difficult choice
between blindly applying the rule of law with the unfortunate outcome of
sending a potentially rehabilitated defendant to prison or rewriting the
individual facts of the case around the existing law. The Court chose the
latter, fitting a square peg into a round hole in order to give Gall a second
chance. 367
Justices Scalia, Souter, Thomas, and Alito provide the only certain
alternative to inconsistent sentencing: re-institute the mandatory Guidelines
but provide for a Sixth Amendment provision requiring additional
sentencing facts to be put to a jury or pled by the defendant. 68
Unfortunately, that solution would completely strip federal judges of their
much-needed discretion.
Kimbrough on the other hand, offers an overreaching, too-little-too-late
remedy.39 Enacting federal criminal sentencing statutes and Guidelines is
the sole province of Congress and the Commission.37° It is not the
Guidelines was thirty to thirty-seven months in prison).
367. In order to somehow justify a sentence of probation for Gall, the majority overstated Gall's
immaturity, the impact of his drug use, and the harshness of probation. See supra notes 137-145 and
accompanying text (discussing the courts inappropriate reliance on Gall's age and chemical
dependency as factors in an extraordinary downward departure from the Guidelines); supra notes116-117 and accompanying text (debating the Court's description of the "hardships" of probation).
Furthermore, the majority completely mischaracterizes Gall's withdrawal from the conspiracy. See
supra note 88 (discussing the conflicting perspectives of Gall's "voluntary" withdrawal from the
conspiracy).
368. See supra Part IV.A.2 (discussing the preference of the four Justices for returning to a
mandatory sentencing scheme).
369. See supra notes 350-352 and accompanying text (discussing Guidelines amendment for
crack in relation to Kimbrough).
370. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371 (1989) (discussing delegation of power); see
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 273-74 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting).
Representatives of the people of the Thirteen Original Colonies spent long, hot months in
the summer of 1787 in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, creating a government of limited
powers. They divided it into three departments-Legislative, Judicial, and Executive.
The Judicial Department was to have no part whatever in making any laws. In fact
proposals looking to vesting some power in the Judiciary to take part in the legislative
process and veto laws were offered, considered, and rejected by the Constitutional
Convention. In my judgment there is not one word, phrase, or sentence from the
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responsibility of the Supreme Court to issue directives to sentencing courts
to disregard some Guidelines they might disfavor and not others. The
Court's holding that the sentencing Guidelines for crack-related offenses are
as advisory as any other under Booker presents little issue.371 However, the
declaration that district courts are free to "conclude... that the
crack/powder disparity yields a sentence 'greater than necessary' .. . even in
a mine-run case" is too vague and expansive.372 Clearly, the intent of
Congress is not to eliminate all disparity in the ratio.373 Can sentencing
judges now ignore any disparity all together and sentence 1-to-I or would
that be going too far?
In the end, it seems highly unlikely that Kimbrough and Gall will result
in any sort of exodus from the Guidelines. When justice requires, district
courts should continue to depart from the Guidelines as prescribed by
Kimbrough and Gall. In doing so, however, sentencing judges must be wary
of pitfalls awaiting jurists who fail to zealously protect the delicate balance
between fairness and consistency.
Chris Gaspard
374
beginning to the end of the Constitution from which it can be inferred that judges were
granted any such legislative power .... [W]hen federal judges use this judicial power for
legislative purposes, I think they wander out of their field of vested powers and transgress
into the area constitutionally assigned to the Congress and the people.
Id. (footnote omitted).
371. See supra note 225 and accompanying text (discussing advisory nature of Guidelines post-
Booker).
372. Kimbrough v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 558, 575 (2007).
373. See supra note 222 (discussing Congress's rejection of a l-to-1 ratio in 1995, and non-
response to recommendations by the Commission to reduce the ratio to 5-to-i in 1997, and again to
20-to-i in 2002).
374. Juris Doctor, December 2008, Pepperdine University School of Law. I would like to thank
the Honorable Rebecca F. Doherty at the United States District Court for the Western District of
Louisiana and her law clerks, Heather Edwards and Kohlie Franzen. I could not have written this
article without the extensive counsel and advice of Mrs. Edwards. However, this article in no way
reflects her remarkable legal writing ability. I would also be remiss in failing to thank my editor,
Tarak Anada, for his patience and inspiration.
APPENDIX
Fig. 1: Fiscal Year 2006 Guidelines Departure Status375
Sentenced Within Guideline Range 43,307 61.7%
Upward Departure from Guideline Range 412 0.6%
Upward Departure with Booker/18 U.S.C.
§ 3553 177 0.3%
Above Guideline Range with Booker 18
U.S.C. § 3553 455 0.6%
All Remaining Cases Above Guideline
Range 85 0.1%
§ 5Kl.1 Substantial Assistance Departure 10,139 14.4%
§ 5K3.1 Early Disposition Program
Departure 5,166 7.4%
Other Government-Sponsored Below
Guideline Range 1,939 2.8%
Downward Departure from Guideline Range 1,903 2.7%
Downward Departure with Booker/18 U.S.C.
§ 3553 1,432 2.0%
Below Guideline Range with Booker 18
U.S.C. § 3553 4,243 6.0%
All Remaining Cases Below Guideline
Range 929 1.3%
375. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS app. A n.2(11th ed. 2006), available at http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2006/appendix A.pdf ("Cases with
missing or inapplicable departure information are excluded. Nationally, this involves the exclusion
of 2,398 cases.").
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Fig. 2: Post-Booker Fiscal Year 2005 Guidelines Departures Status
(01/12/05-09/30/05)376
Sentenced Within Guideline Range 31,623 61.6%
Upward Departure from the Guideline Range 100 0.2%
Upward Departure with Booker/18 U.S.C. 36 0.1%
§ 3553
Above the Range with Booker/18 U.S.C. 343 0.7%
§ 3553
All Remaining Cases Above the Guideline 342 0.7%
Range
§ 5K1.1 Substantial Assistance Departure 7,524 14.7%
§ 5K3.1 Early Disposition Program 3,208 6.2%
Departure
Government-Sponsored Departure 1,481 2.9%
Downward Departure from the Guideline 1,197 2.3%
Range
Downward Departure with Booker/18 U.S.C. 487 0.9%
§ 3553
Below the Range with Booker/18 U.S.C. 3,199 6.2%
§ 3553
All Remaining Cases Below the Guideline 1,806 3.5%
Range
376. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS app. A n.2
(Post-Booker) (10th ed. 2005), available at http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2005/Appendix A
Post.pdf. ("Cases with missing or inapplicable departure information are excluded. Nationally, this
involves the exclusion of 2,327 cases.").
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Fig. 3: Pre-Bookfr Fiscal Year 2005 Guidelines Departures Status(10/01/04-01/11/05) 377
Sentenced Within Guideline Range 12,406 70.9%
Substantial Assistance Departure 2,575 14.7%
Government Sponsored Downward 1,643 9.4%
Departure
Other Downward Departure 752 4.3%
Upward Departure 128 0.7%
Fig. 4: Post-Blakely Fiscal Year 2004 Guidelines Departures Status
(06/25/04-09/30/04) 378
Sentenced Within Guideline Range 12,059 71.8%
Substantial Assistance Departure 2,425 14.4%
Government Sponsored Downward 1,441 8.6%
Departure
Other Downward Departure 772 4.6%
Upward Departure 95 0.6%
377. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS app. A n.2
(Pre-Booker) (10th ed. 2005), available at http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2005/Appendix A
Pre.pdf ("Cases with missing or inapplicable departure information are excluded. Nationally, this
involves the exclusion of 1,284 cases.").
378. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS app. A n.2
(Post-Blakely) (9th ed. 2004), available at http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2004/Appendix A
Post.pdf ("Cases with missing or inapplicable departure information are excluded. Nationally, this
involves the exclusion of 1,411 cases.").
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Fig. 5: Pre-Blakely Fiscal Year 2004 Guidelines Departures Status(10/01/03.06/24/04) 379 ....
Sentenced Within Guideline Range 34,815 172.2%
Substantial Assistance Departure 7,484 15.5%
Government Sponsored Downward 3,071 6.4%
Departure
Other Downward Departure 2,499 5.2%
Upward Departure 382 0.8%
Fig. 6: Fiscal Year 2003 Guidelines Departures Status
380
Sentenced Within Guideline Range 45,253 69.4%
Substantial Assistance Departure 10,360 15.9%
Government Initiated Downward Departure 4,121 6.3%
Other Downward Departure 4,896 7.5%
Upward Departure 541 0.8%
379. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS app. A n.2
(Pre-Blakely) (9th ed. 2004), available at http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2004/Appendix A Pre.pdf
("Cases with missing or inapplicable departure information are excluded. Nationally, this involves
the exclusion of 3,614 cases.").
380. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS app. A n.2
(8th ed. 2003), available at http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2003/AppA-03.htm ("Cases with
missing or inapplicable departure information are excluded. Nationally, this involves the exclusion
of 5,087 cases.").
Fig. 7: Fiscal Year 2002 Guidelines Departures Status 381
Sentenced Within Guideline Range 38,159 65.0%
Substantial Assistance Departure 10,203 17.4%
Other Downward Departure 9,865 16.8%
Upward Departure 4570.8%
Fig. 8: Fiscal Year 2001 Guidelines Departures Status 382
Sentenced Within Guideline Range 35,128 64.0%
Substantial Assistance Departure 9,390 17.1%
Other Downward Departure 10,026 18.3%
Upward Departure 307 0.6%
381. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS app. A n.2
(7th ed. 2002), available at http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2002/AppA-02.htm ("Cases with
missing or inapplicable departure information are excluded. Nationally, this involves the exclusion
of 5,682 eases.").
382. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS app. A n.2
(6th ed. 2001), available at http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2001/AppA_01.htm ("Cases with
missing or indeterminable departure information are excluded. Nationally, this involves the
exclusion of 5,046 cases.").
